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Previous literature has focused on firms’ characteristics to explain changes in capital structure 
choices. Nevertheless, external capital availability is also an important factor when determining 
the amount of leverage. Exploring this idea, and using the Survey on Access to Finance of Small 
and Medium Enterprises (SAFE) as our database, this dissertation examines how the access to 
external finance impacts changes in the capital structure of SMEs in Europe. The empirical 
results using a probit model suggest that (i) improvements in firms’ own capital and credit 
history lead to decreases and increases in leverage levels, respectively, when considering 
demand conditions. When focusing on supply factors (ii) increases in fees and commissions 
lead to decreases in leverage, while increases in loan size and loan maturity increase firms’ 
leverage. Financial constraints have also been analyzed. Considering the failure in external 
finance applications as a constraint, (i) improvements in own capital have a significant negative 
impact on unconstrained firms’ leverage, while (ii) increases in loan size and loan maturity has 
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A literatura já existente tem-se focado nas características das empresas para explicar as 
mudanças na escolha da estrutura de capital. Contudo, a disponibilidade do financiamento 
externo é também um fator importante ao determinar o montante de dívida que a empresa vai 
contrair. Tendo com consideração este facto, e utilizando o questionário relativo ao acesso ao 
financiamento de Pequenas e Médias Empresas (SAFE) como base de dados, esta dissertação 
analisa como o acesso ao financiamento externo influencia as alterações na estrutura de capital 
das Pequenas e Médias Empresas na Europa. Os resultados empíricos, utilizando um modelo 
probit indicam que, ao considerar as condições de procura, (i) melhorias no capital próprio e no 
historial de crédito das empresas levam a diminuições e aumentos no nível da divida, 
respetivamente. Ao analisar os fatores de oferta, (ii) aumentos das taxas e comissões levam a 
diminuições no nível da dívida, enquanto aumentos na dimensão e maturidade do empréstimo 
aumentam o nível de dívida. Restrições financeiras foram igualmente analisadas. Tendo em 
consideração o insucesso na candidatura ao financiamento externo como uma restrição, (i) 
melhorias no capital próprio têm um impacto negativo na dívida das empresas sem restrições 
financeiras, enquanto (ii) aumentos na dimensão e aumento dos empréstimos têm um impacto 
positivo superior no nível de dívida das empresas restringidas financeiramente. 
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The aim of this dissertation is to give continuity to the empirical research that has been 
developed regarding the firms’ capital structure, exploring one of the main factors behind it, 
i.e. the access to external finance. Using firm level data from the Survey on Access to Finance 
of Enterprises (SAFE), which explores how SMEs access external finance in Europe, the main 
goal of this dissertation is to answer the following problem statement: what is the impact of the 
access to external finance on the capital structure of SMEs in Europe? SAFE inquiries SMEs 
regarding the demand and supply factors that affect their access to external finance. Hence, the 
main research question is then split in two main components: (i) what is the impact of the 
demand conditions underlying the access to external finance; and (ii) what is the impact of 
supply conditions imposed to access to external financing, on the capital structure of SMEs. 
Additionally, SMEs’ financial constraints in access to external finance are taken into 
consideration, when testing their impact on capital structures. 
Firstly, the main concepts explored in this dissertation are defined. Having it clarified, the 
hypotheses underlying the research question are presented as well as the main contribution of 
this dissertation. 
 
1.1. Capital Structure defined 
Capital structure represents the firms’ choices regarding their capital composition, where firms 
should balance their debt and equity financing. Even though Modigliani and Miller (1958) have 
defended the irrelevance of this structure, the market frictions led to consider the benefits and 
costs of debt when deciding firms’ financing sources. There are several capital structure 
theories that try to explain how firms execute their financing decisions. Known authors such as 
Shyam and Myers (1999), Frank and Goyal (2003), and Fama and French (2002) have studied 
firms’ characteristics to examine them, namely the trade-off and the pecking order theory. 
Nevertheless, as stated by Myers (2003), there are different factors for different firms under 
different conditions that limit the applicability of one unique theory. 
 
1.2. Access to external finance defined 
External finance, as it indicates, comprises financing sources found outside the firms’ business. 
Mainly, they are considered through (i) banks, (ii) creditors (e.g. trade credit, factoring or 
leasing) and (iii) securities. Its access depends usually on (i) demand conditions faced by firms 
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and (ii) supply side terms. Recent authors have studied how imperfections arising from the 
capital markets (Titman, 2002), costliness of the information (Faulkender and Peternsen, 2005) 
or availability of loanable funds (Leary, 2005) influence leverage levels. Hence, 
complementing the demand characteristics influencing the access to finance, supply-side 
factors impact on firms’ leverage have also been object of empirical studies. 
 
1.3. Hypothesis development 
Recent literature has defended that not only firms’ characteristics impact their capital structure 
but also the access to external financing. Deviating from the well-known capital structure 
theories deeply explored in the literature, several studies have separated the supply and demand 
drivers of credit usage, focusing on the bank and firm roles regarding the credit provision. 
Namely, Faulkender and Petersen (2005) divides the access to external finance in both (i) 
supply and (ii) demand side.  
Hence, to address the main problem statement of this dissertation, i.e. the impact of the access 
to external finance on the capital structure of SMEs in Europe, three main hypotheses are 
presented as below. 
Hypothesis 1: Firms’ demand conditions that are relevant to access external finance influence 
positively their leverage ratios. 
Under this hypothesis it is expected that our analysis allows the verification of the following: 
(i) Leverage ratios increase as firm’s general economic outlook improves, ceteris 
paribus 
(ii) Leverage ratios increase as firm’s access to public financial support improves, 
ceteris paribus 
(iii) Leverage ratios decrease as firm’s own capital improves, ceteris paribus 
(iv) Leverage ratios increase as firm’s credit history improves, ceteris paribus 
Hypothesis 2: External financing terms and conditions influence negatively leverage ratios.  
Under this hypothesis it is expected that our analysis allows the verification of the following: 
(i) Leverage ratios decrease as interest rate levels increase, ceteris paribus 
(ii) Leverage ratios decrease as other costs of financing, such as charges, fees and 
commissions increase, ceteris paribus 
(iii) Leverage ratios increase as the available size of the loan or credit line increase, 
ceteris paribus 
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(iv) Leverage ratios increase as the available maturity of the loan increases, ceteris 
paribus 
(v) Leverage ratios decrease as collateral requirements increase, ceteris paribus 
The SAFE questionnaire, which explores how the demand and supply factors affect SMEs 
access to external finance, allows for the separation of the analysis of access to finance in these 
two factors (Faulkender and Petersen, 2005). The first hypothesis supports the demand side 
through (i) general economic outlook, (ii) access to public financial support (iii) own capital 
and (iv) credit history, while the second hypothesis explores the supply side through (i) interest 
rate level, (ii) fees and commissions, (iii) collaterals, (iv) loan maturity, (v) loan size, and (vi) 
other conditions. Additionally, the relation between the access to external finance conditions 
and firms’ financial structure is controlled for using common characteristics that literature has 
defended as important for capital structures and are questioned in the survey.  
Nevertheless, several authors have studied capital structure taking into consideration financial 
constraints. It has been examined whether financial constrained firms have different capital 
structures when compared to unconstrained firms, either to study the impact of macroeconomic 
conditions (Korajczyka and Levy, 2003 and Campello et all, 2010) or through firm-specific 
characteristics (Leary, 2005). Hence it leads to the third hypothesis raised in this dissertation, 
as presented below.  
Hypothesis 3: External financing influences differently constrained and unconstrained firms’ 
leverage ratios. 
In this specific case, following previous literature findings but considering the data available, 
the survey allows a specific measure of financial constraints to explore the third hypothesis. 
SMEs are questioned about their application to external finance, which supports the main goal 
of this dissertation. Yet, the resulting from the success that firms had in applying for external 
finance is also surveyed, which turns possible the last hypothesis raised. 
 
1.4. Contribution of the present dissertation 
This study adds to the literature by analyzing how the access to external financing, i.e. supply 
of credit and demand for credit, influences the capital structure of the SMEs considered in the 
Survey on Access to Finance of Small and Medium Enterprises (SAFE). To our best 
knowledge, this dissertation is one of the first studies exploring SAFE in order to assess the 
impact of access to external sources of finance on SMEs’ capital structures. 
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Hence, the present dissertation contributes to the literature, when exploring SAFE, in the 
following dimensions. Firstly, it is uses qualitative data to examine a quantitative subject such 
as capital structure ratios, differentiating the methodology used. Secondly, having access to the 
questionnaire allows the usage of micro data across countries that is usually difficult to access 
and usually not comparable.  
Moreover, the variation in the firm’s capital structures has been extensively explored through 
demand factors, i.e. firm’s characteristics. Hence, this study fills the gap by considering credit 
supply through bank financing terms and conditions but also firms’ conditions to apply to this 
external finance. Additionally, the survey was conducted during the current period of financial 
crisis, namely in Europe, where financial constraints are likely to occur, helping the analysis of 
the topic. The financial crisis opens space to investigate how financial constraints impact 
corporate behavior and the relevance of macroeconomic conditions on the capital structure of 
firms. 
The remainder of the study is presented as follows. Section 2 provides the literature review. 
Section 3 examines the data and methodology used. Section 4 discusses the results. Section 5 
presents the robustness procedures used. Conclusions are reported in Section 6, while Section 
7 refers the main limitations and future research. Finally, Section 8 includes all the references 
to the present dissertation and Section 9 presents all the tables and additional information to the 




2. Literature Review 
Capital structure is a puzzling subject that has been explored over the decades by numerous 
authors. Starting with Modigliani and Miller (1958), their theorem defends the irrelevance of 
financing decisions to both firm value and cost of capital, as long as the main goal is value 
maximization. 
This theorem is supported by two main propositions: (i) the irrelevance of capital structure 
proposition, which assuming the presence of perfect capital markets states that the value of 
firms is not affected by the capital structure decisions; and (ii) the linearity between cost of 
equity and capital structure of firms, meaning that any increase of debt leads to an increase on 
the cost of equity. According to this, even though debt is a cheaper source of financing, the 
increase of debt is compensated with an increase in the cost of equity, eliminating the advantage 
of using leverage. 
However, there are several frictions in the market that do not support Modigliani and Miller 
first assumptions. By assuming perfect capital markets, the theorem led to the exclusion of 
important realities such as corporate taxes, bankruptcy and agency costs as well as information 
asymmetry. The access to external finance conditions (both the demand and supply conditions), 
explored in this dissertation, is also an important factor when considering capital structure 
decisions. Theories have tried to explain these frictions throughout the decades. Modigliani and 
Miller (1963) themselves reformulated the theorem, and considered the benefits and costs of 
debt. This created the basis for the static trade-off theory, which supports the existence of 
optimal capital structures. According to Myers (1977), there are major forces – the benefits and 
costs of leverage in firms – that push firms towards an optimal target leverage. Consequently, 
an optimal capital structure may be reached, where the benefits of an incremental unit of debt 
will just offset the costs.  
The major benefits of debt taken into consideration are the tax-deductibility of debt finance and 
the reduction of agency problems arising from the manager-shareholder relationship. 
According to Miller and Scholes (1978), firms with higher expected tax rates, compared to the 
constant marginal personal cost, have more book leverage. As stated by Miller (1977), personal 
taxes can offset the benefits of interest deductibility. Moreover, DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) 
add that firms with non-debt tax-shields have less book leverage, creating an offsetting effect 
on capital structure.  
Agency problems, namely manager-shareholder relationships, also increase the optimal debt 
ratio. According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), Easterbrook (1984) and Jensen (1986), 
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interests of managers are not aligned with shareholders leading managers to take actions that 
are not entirely consistent with the goals of the shareholders. Thus, dividends and debt help 
reducing funds available for managers to spend, becoming substitutes for the control of free 
cash flow agency problems. Firms with more profitable assets have higher dividend payouts 
and more leverage, when controlling for investment opportunities. Likewise, firms with larger 
profitable investments have lower dividend payout and leverage, when controlling for 
profitability.  
On the other hand, the costs of leverage include the agency costs of financial distress, i.e., 
bankruptcy costs and agency conflicts from the stockholder-bondholder relationship. The trade-
off theory defends that more profitable firms have more book leverage, whereas firms with 
variable earnings have less book leverage. Therefore, when profitability declines the expected 
bankruptcy costs rise pushing less profitable firms to lower leverage targets. Lastly, with respect 
to stockholder-bondholder agency problems, Fama and Miller (1972), Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) and Myers (1977) also defend that firms with more expected investments have lower 
dividend payouts and less current leverage.  
Corporate finance literature has corroborated these predictions. Several studies provide direct 
evidence demonstrating that firms adjust their capital structure towards a target leverage. Marsh 
(1982) and Auerbach (1985), using a logit model, have found evidence that firms adjust towards 
a target debt ratio. Likewise, Taggart (1977), Jalilvand and Harris (1984) and Opler and Titman 
(1994) through target-adjustment models have reached the same conclusions. Nevertheless, 
there are also evidence from other authors demonstrating inconsistencies with the target debt 
ratios. Kester (1986), Long and Malitz (1985), Titman and Wessels (1988), Rajan and Zingales 
(1995) and Fama and French (2002) identified corporate profits as a major drawback of the 
trade-off theory. It finds negative relationships between debt ratios and profitability. Likewise, 
Myers (1984) highlights that tax effects seem to be empirically weak and Bradley et al. (1984) 
a strong direct relation between firm leverage and the relative amount of non-debt tax shields.  
Hence, the inconsistency between authors as well as adverse selection and the transaction costs 
of issuing securities leads to an alternative theory, the pecking order theory.  
The pecking order theory suggests a hierarchical preference regarding the financing sources. 
Firms prefer first the use of internal funds to the use of external funds, since it prevents the 
asymmetric information between managers and less-informed outside investors (Myers and 
Majluf, 1984) and the high costs associated with new issues (Myers, 1984). Once retained 
earnings are exhausted, firms prefer to issue debt. Inside investors consider retained earnings a 
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better source of financing than debt, but debt a better option regarding equity. It contains less 
asymmetry of information and is considered less risky, offering outside investors lower rates 
of return on debt than on equity. Lastly, when debt is no longer an option, equity is issued. 
Thus, leverage is not determined by the costs and benefits of debt, characteristic of the trade-
off model but by the net cash flows produced by the firm. According to Myers (1984), when 
controlling for investment opportunities, firms with more profitable assets have higher long-
term dividend payouts and less leverage. When controlling for profitability, firms with more 
investments have lower long-term dividend payouts and more leverage. 
Shyam and Myers (1999), supporting the pecking-order theory, are recognized by the testing 
strategy implemented in both theories, the trade-off model and the pecking order theory. The 
idea is not to test a model of capital structure options that could influence it but focus on the 
specifications of both theories. Once defined, these are used to test the target leverage, the mean 
reversion of leverage and the short-term response of dividends and debt to variation in earnings 
and investment.  
In fact, several authors have tested various models, which include a variety of hypothesis 
together in the empirical tests, in order to identify the major determinants of capital structure. 
Titman and Wessels (1988), who included all the hypothesis jointly in the empirical tests, found 
that leverage decreases with uniqueness, firm size and past profitability. However, there was 
no support regarding non-debt tax shields, volatility, collateral value or future growth. On the 
other hand, Harris and Raviv (1991), who explain the conventional range of variables, conclude 
that leverage increases with fixed assets, non-debt tax shields, growth opportunities, and firm 
size and decreases with volatility, advertising expenditures, research and development 
expenditures, bankruptcy probability, profitability and uniqueness of the product. Several other 
authors tested the numerous factors that could explain the capital structure and eventually 
support the theories mentioned above. However, as mentioned by Frank and Goyal (2003) 
excluding them is an important omission but including all of them leads to tough tests for the 
pecking order theory.  
Nevertheless, the pecking order model is a competitor to other explanatory models of capital 
structure, i.e. the market timing theory. According to Baker and Wurgler (2002), managers 
evaluate market current conditions and raise funds – debt or equity – in those that seem more 
favorable to them. Firms tend to issue more equity when its cost is low, issuing debt otherwise. 
Even though it does not consider the traditional factors described above, it takes into 
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consideration the access to external finance conditions (i.e. the supply side conditions such as 
the cost of the external finance options). 
Finally, capital structure is a continuous research topic. Different authors support different 
views. As stated by Myers (1984), if we require the pecking order theory to explain everything, 
it will be easily rejected. There is no universal capital structure theory but conditional theories, 
highlighting important factors for different firms in different circumstances (Myers, 2003).  
According to Korajczyka and Levy (2003), the variation in macroeconomic conditions can lead 
firms to adopt different capital structures at different points in time. Considering financial 
constraints, i.e. not having enough cash to undertake investment opportunities and facing severe 
agency costs when requesting external financing, it shows that unconstrained firms are more 
sensitive to variations in macroeconomic conditions. Unconstrained firms deviated from their 
“target” to time their issues when market conditions are more favorable, while constrained firms 
were more sensitive to deviations from the target leverage. Moreover, it demonstrates that 
unconstrained firms have counter-cyclical leverage, while constrained firms’ leverage varies 
pro-cyclically with macroeconomic conditions. Campello et al (2010) show that constrained 
firms tend to use internal funding and concentrate in getting credit from banks, to deal with the 
financial crisis and preparing for limited access to credit in the future, respectively. 
Hence, both firm-specific factors and macroeconomic conditions lead to variations on financing 
choices, which also change according to firm’s financial market access. The market frictions 
that highlight capital structure choices – information asymmetry – also lead firms to be 
restricted by their lenders (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Not only the demand side characteristics 
but also the supply side conditions (such as the cost of debt and leverage availability), explored 
in this dissertation, are important when defining the capital structure of firms. According to 
Leary (2005), supply frictions in the credit markets are relevant for the firms’ capital structures 
and firms do change the composition of financing sources in response to limited credit. Small, 
bank-dependent firms decreased their leverage following negative loan supply shocks. 
Thus, debt ratios should depend also on access to external sources of capital. When considering 
firm’s capital structure, both the determinants of preferred leverage (demand side) and 
constraints on the capacity to increase leverage (supply side) should be considered (Faulkender 
and Petersen, 2005). 
Summing up, capital structure has been studied by several authors that support different 
approaches in order to explain firm’s financing choices. The inconsistency between empirical 
 9 
results leads to the acceptability of different theories – namely, the trade-off and pecking order 
theory – to explain capital structures. As Harris and Raviv’s (1991) conclude, the reasons and 
conditions that determine the capital structure choices are almost countless. However, the 
market frictions and the empirical periods selected among others have been pointed out as an 
important factor of analysis. Macroeconomics factors have highlighted the importance of 
financial constraints in shaping the capital structure of firms.  
Hence, taking into consideration the questionnaire on access to finance of SMEs in Europe 
(SAFE)1 this dissertation aims to test how the access to external finance influence the capital 
structure of European SMEs.  
                                                 
1 There are several studies, such as Ferrando and Griesshaber (2011) and Holton, Lawless and McCann (2012), 
which have explored the access to external finance of SMEs in different contexts. 
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3. Data and Methodology 
This section starts with the description of the data used in this study. Then based on the sample 
chosen, the defined variables are explained as well as the hypotheses behind them. Lastly, the 
methodology used to test the hypotheses is presented. 
 
3.1. Data  
For this analysis the Survey on Access to Finance of Small and Medium Enterprises (SAFE), 
in Europe was used.  
The European Central Bank (ECB) has conducted the SAFE survey in half-yearly waves since 
2009. Its main goal is to assess the financing needs of SMEs, their practice in accessing external 
finance and their perceptions regarding current economic and financial conditions. Hence, it 
conducts an array of questions that allows the separation between the supply and demand 
factors affecting the access to finance. For the supply side, terms and conditions of bank 
financing were considered, i.e. interest rate level, fees and comissions, collateral requirements, 
size of the loan and maturity of the loan. Regarding the demand side, factors affecting the 
availability of external finance were considered, i.e. firm’s general economic outlook, access 
to public financial support, firm’s own capital and their credit history.  
The database, covering a period from 2009 to 2015, does not include the same observations, 
i.e. SMEs across Europe comprised in the survey, each year. Hence, this dissertation considers 
as sample the first wave conducted in 2015, which includes 17.979 observations. Nevertheless, 
since the main goal is to assess the impact of access to external finance the sample was redefined 
in order to capture only firms that had applied for this type of financing in the last 6 months, 
according with the date of the survey. Hence it includes (i) bank loan, (ii) credit line, bank 
overdraft or credit overdraft, (iii) trade credit or (iv) other external finance applications. After 
these exclusions, a final sample is left with 16.916 firms. 
 
3.2. Variables definition 
Given that the idea is to examine how the access to external finance impact firms’ capital 
structure, a range of variables that can represent the supply and demand side of external finance 
are considered in order to discuss the possible impact on capital structure. The database selected 
for this study comprises 24 variables, which were created based on the SAFE questions. Below 
we describe all the variables – dependent, independent and control – used in this analysis, while 
in Appendix 1 we present the details on their definitions. 
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Dependent variables 
In order to analyze the changes on SMEs capital structures, the following variables are used as 
proxies. 
DebtoAssets is the increase of firms’ debt compared to assets over the past 6 months according 
with the date of the survey. The ratio of debt to total assets is the common variable to assess 
firm’s leverage, which indicates the proportion of assets that are financed with debt. Moreover, 
Shyam and Myers (1999), Fama and French (2002) and Frank and Goyal (2003) use the 
variation of this ratio to analyze capital structure theories, such as trade-off and pecking order 
theory. Since the data is taken from a survey, this represents the best proxy to assess variation 
in firms’ leverage.   
BankLoan is the raise of a new loan or a renewal of the loan over the past 6 months according 
with the date of the survey. When considering external finance, several external sources of 
financing, from internal funds to trade credit were questioned. Bank debt represents one of the 
most common costly external sources of financing. Even though it is included in DebtoAssets, 
this variable aims to represent solely its effect.  
 
Explanatory variables 
In order to explain changes in SMEs capital structure we should take into account both demand 
and supply factors according with SAFE, i.e. factors affecting the availability of external 
finance and terms and conditions of bank financing, respectively. Regarding the latter, the idea 
is to include the frictions firms have encountered when trying to access external finance, as 
performed by Campello, Graham and Harvey (2010). Hence, variables are divided into the 
following two main categories: 
 
(i) Demand conditions proxies 
Several questions were asked about external financing availability and willingness of external 
partners to provide financing. However, the “availability” is influenced by firms’ performance 
and historical behaviors. Hence, firm’s factors affecting financing availability were taken into 
consideration:  
GenEconOutlook is the firm’s perspective regarding the change in its general economic 
outlook. It is a dichotomous variable that assumes 1 if it improved over the last 6 months before 
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the questionnaire. Yet, it assumes 0 if its general economic outlook perspective remained 
unchanged or deteriorated during the same period. 
AccessPubFin represents the access to public financial support, over the past 6 months 
according with the date of the survey. It is also a dichotomous variable that assumes 1 if it 
improved over the last 6 months before the questionnaire. Yet, it assumes 0 if the access to 
public finance remained unchanged or deteriorated during the same period. According to 
Faulkender and Petersen (2005), firms without access to public debt markets are constrained 
by private lenders in the amount they can rise, resulting in lower debt ratios. 
OwnCapital represents the improvement of the firm’s own capital, over the past 6 months 
according with the date of the survey. It is a dichotomous variable that assumes 1 if it improved 
over the last 6 months before the questionnaire. Yet, it assumes 0 if its own capital remained 
unchanged or deteriorated during the same period. 
CreditHist represents the improvement of the firm’s credit history, over the past 6 months 
according with the date of the survey. It is a dichotomous variable that assumes 1 if it improved 
over the last 6 months before the questionnaire and 0 otherwise, i.e. remained unchanged or 
deteriorated over the same period. 
 
(ii) Bank loan supply proxies 
Supply side drivers can affect credit conditions, without being directly related with the 
borrower’s characteristics. Here terms and conditions of bank financing (i.e. bank loans, 
overdrafts and credit lines) are used as proxy variables. 
IntRate represents the change of the level of interest rates over the past 6 months according 
with the date of the survey. It is a dichotomous variable that assumes 1 if it increased over the 
last 6 months before the questionnaire and 0 otherwise, which means remaining unchanged or 
decreasing during the same period. 
FeesandComiss is an extension of the costs of financing besides interest rates. Here the change 
of the level of charges, fees and commissions are considered. It is also a dichotomous variable 
that assumes 1 if it increased over the last 6 months before the questionnaire and 0 otherwise. 
Collat are the changes on the collateral requirements demanded over the past 6 months 
according with the date of the survey. Therefore, if banks have increased their collateral 
demands to provide finance the variable equals to 1, and 0 otherwise. 
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LoanMat refers to the change in the maturity of the loan over the past 6 months according with 
the date of the survey. It is a dichotomous variable that assumes 1 if the loan maturity’s 
availability increased over the last 6 months before the questionnaire. Yet, it assumes 0 if its 
availability remained unchanged or decreased during the same period. 
LoanSize refers to the change in the size of the loan over the past 6 months according with the 
date of the survey. It is a dichotomous variable that assumes 1 if the loan size increased over 
the last 6 months before the questionnaire. Yet, it assumes 0 if it remained unchanged or 
decreased during the same period. Leary (2005) defends that firms without access to public 
debt markets need substitute sources of capital when loan supply reduces. These replacements 
result in relatively lower leverage following loan supply contractions. 
OtherCond represents specific requirements to access external financing, specifically bank 
loans. Thus, it indicates whether required guarantees, information requirements, procedures, 
time required for loan approval or loan covenants increased over the past 6 months. As a 
dichotomous variable, if these requirements increased, it equals to 1. If these requirements 
remained unchanged or decreased, this variable equals to 0. 
 
Control variables  
To determine the relationship between the change in leverage and the access to external finance, 
i.e. the supply and demand effects described above, it is important to control for other firm 
characteristics that may influence leverage ratios (Faulkender and Petersen, 2005).  
There are several characteristics studied in the literature that are also present in the SAFE 
questionnaire. By including these nominal variables, it is possible to control for determinants 
of leverage that are common within characteristics of firms. 
Country is a nominal variable that represents the country where each firm is based. Since the 
survey considers the 28 countries in Europe, countries were selected based on G8, the eight 
most industrialized countries that meet to discuss global issues, along with their size. Hence, 
France, Germany, Italy and United Kingdom were considered together with Spain and Portugal. 
Industry is a nominal variable that can assume, according with the survey division the following 
activities: Industry (Mining and Manufacturing), Construction, Trade (Wholesale and Retail 
Trade), Services (Transport, Real State, Other Services) or Other Activities. 
Ownership is a nominal variable that represents who owns the larger stake in the enterprise.  
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Thus, according to the survey answers, it can assume the following owners: Public 
shareholders, Family or entrepreneurs, Venture Capital Enterprises or Business Angels, One 
owner only, or lastly Other enterprises or business associates. 
Maturity is a nominal variable that represents how old is the firm, i.e. it works as a measure of 
maturity of firms. Then, according to the survey options to the question, it can assume the 
following ranges: Old (10 years or more), Middle (5 years or more but less than 10 years), 
Young (2 years or more but less than 5 years) or Startup (Less than 2 years). 
Size is a nominal value that represents the number of employees the enterprise employs either 
full or part time in all of its locations. Thus, the number of employees is used as a proxy for 
size and can assume the following dimensions: Micro (1-9 employees), Small (10-49 
employees), Medium (50-249 employees) or Large (250+ employees). Historically leverage 
has been positively correlated with size (Harris and Raviv, 1991; Fama and French, 2002; Frank 
& Goyal, 2003). Likewise, according to Faulkender and Petersen (2005), small private firms, 
with the less public information are more credit constrained.  
Profit is a dichotomous variable that represents changes in profit (net income after taxes) over 
the last 6 months before the questionnaire. As a dichotomous variable, if profitability increased, 
profit equals to 1. If it remained unchanged or decreased, this variable equals to 0. Profitability 
is an important characteristic when studying capital structures, since it either supports the trade-
off or the pecking order theory. Hence, recognized authors such as Myers (1977) support the 
positive correlation between leverage and profit until it reaches an optimal target leverage. 
However, several authors defend that more profitable firms have lower leverage (Titman and 
Wessels, 1988; Harris and Raviv 1991; Fama and French, 2002; Frank & Goyal, 2003). 
FixedInvest is a dichotomous variable that represents changes in firm’s fixed investment – 
investment in property, plant, machinery or equipment – over the last 6 months before the 
questionnaire. Therefore, it assumes 1 if it increased over the last 6 months before the 
questionnaire. Yet, it assumes 0 if fixed investment remained unchanged or decreased during 
the same period. Investment is widely considered by literature, but different proxies are used 
leading to conflicting evidence regarding the relation between investment and leverage (Fama 
and French, 2002). Hence, according with Harris and Raviv (1991) and Fama and French 
(2002), investments or expected investments are negatively related with leverage. Moreover, 
since it includes investment in tangible assets, it can measure firm’s assets tangibility as 
performed by Faulkender and Petersen (2005). Firms with more tangible assets are more likely 
to have higher debt ratios (Harris and Raviv, 1991; Shyam and Myers, 1999; and Frank and 
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Goyal, 2003). 
IWC is a dichotomous variable that represents changes in inventories and working capital over 
the last 6 months before the questionnaire. The variable assumes 1 if it increased over the last 
6 months before the questionnaire and 0 otherwise, i.e. remained unchanged or decreased over 
the same period. 
UnconstDebt is a dichotomous variable, which represents a successful application to external 
sources of finance, i.e. (i) bank loan, (ii) credit line, bank overdraft or credit line overdraft, (iii) 
trade credit or (iv) other external finance. Hence, the variable takes 1 if the firm succeeded in 
getting at least one of the finance sources and 0 otherwise. Numerous authors have defined 
constraints as a driver to analyze the sample selected (Korajczyka and Levy, 2003; Campello 
et all, 2010). Several criteria can be used according to the purpose of the study and the data 
available. However, the SAFE question itself characterized financial constrained firms. After 
excluding companies that did not apply to external finance, firms that succeed in applying to at 
least one external finance source were considered as unconstrained, and constrained otherwise.  
AccesstoFin is a dichotomous variable that represents how SMEs consider, from 1 to 10, 
“Access to Finance” as the most pressing problem. The variable assumes “1” if firms select 
“Access to Finance” as their most pressing problem between 1 and 5, and “0” if firms select 
“Acess to Finance” as the most pressing problem between 6 and 10. 
CrisisCountries is a dichotomous variable generated to classify SMEs based on their countries 
macroeconomic conditions. The variable assumes “1” if the categorical variable country 
assumes “Greece”, “Italy”, “Ireland”, “Portugal” or “Spain”; and “0” otherwise, i.e. other 
countries that were not extremely influenced by the crisis. 
NoLarge is a dichotomous variable created to classify SMEs according with their size. The 
variable assumes “1” if the categorical variable size assumes “Micro”, “Small”, or “Medium”; 
and “0” if size is “Large”.  
 
3.3. Methodology  
To assess how the access to external financing impacts the capital structure of SMEs across 
Europe, testing the hypothesis formulated above, several regressions were created and tested.  
The basis is a general linear regression, which aims to examine how the access to external 
financing impacts the capital structure of SMEs across Europe. Thus, firms’ leverage variables 
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(DebtoAssets and BankLoan) are considered a function of access to market capital variables, 
i.e. demand conditions (GenEconOutlook, AccessPubFin, OwnCapital and CreditHist) and 
bank loan supply (IntRate, FeesandComiss, Collat, LoanMat, LoanSize and OtherCond). A set 
of control variables (Country, Industry, Ownership, Maturity, Size, Profit, FixedInvest, and 
IWC) is also considered. 
 
Firstly, regressions were run as stated below. 
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑜𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖 =  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐺𝑒𝑛𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑖 +  𝛽2𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑢𝑏𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑖+ 𝛽3𝑂𝑤𝑛𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖 +
 𝛽4𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐻𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽5𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽6𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑎𝑛𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖 +  𝛽7𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖 +  𝛽8𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑖 +
 𝛽9𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖+ 𝛽10𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖 +   𝛽11𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖                                        (1)  
𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑖 =  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐺𝑒𝑛𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑖 +  𝛽2𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑢𝑏𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑖+ 𝛽3𝑂𝑤𝑛𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖 +
 𝛽4𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐻𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽5𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽6𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑎𝑛𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖 +  𝛽7𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖 +  𝛽8𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑖 +
 𝛽9𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖+ 𝛽10𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖 +   𝛽11𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖                                        (2)                                                                                       
 
SAFE has a range of questions that allowed the definition of these variables but they are limited 
by areas of interest, which influences their relevance regarding different external sources of 
financing. Thus, even though the variables that represent the access to external finance, i.e. the 
supply and demand side, both try to explain the SMEs capital structure, they revealed to be 
more appropriate depending on the dependent variable.  
Hence, in a second version of the regressions proposed that will be considered across the 
remaining dissertation, the regressions models convert to:  
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑜𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖 =  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐺𝑒𝑛𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑖 +  𝛽2𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑢𝑏𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑖+ 𝛽3𝑂𝑤𝑛𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖 +
 𝛽4𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐻𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖 +  𝛽5𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖                                                                      (3)  
𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑖 =  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑎𝑛𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖 +  𝛽3𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖 +  𝛽4𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑖 +
 𝛽5𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖+ 𝛽6𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖+ 𝛽9𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖                                              (4)                                                                                       
 
As observable, the variables that represent the demand and supply side are not considered in 
both regressions proposed. The demand side relate to the conditions that influence the access 
to external finance in general, which in this dissertation will try to explain DebtoAssets (the 
debt variables that comprise the several possibilities of financing). The supply side as 
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mentioned above relate to the terms and conditions to raise bank loans, implying their relevance 
in explaining a specific type of debt also considered, i.e. BankLoan variable.  
Regarding the estimators used, the OLS estimators, one of the most common regression 
methodologies, allows the inclusion of binary or categorical variables on the right side of the 
regressions. However, it is a linear probability model, whose errors (i.e. residuals) disrupt the 
homoscedasticity and normality of errors assumptions, when using binary dependent variables. 
The binary nature of variables, inducing heteroscedasticity, results in invalid standard errors 
and hypothesis tests. 
Therefore, the most standard regression alternatives are either the probit or the logistic/logit 
estimators. Even though the distributional assumptions are vaguely different (i.e. involving 
either a normal or logit distribution, respectively), both models are maximum likelihood 
estimators, leading to similar results. Specifically, while the probit coefficient refers to the 
likelihood of the dependent variable being equal to “1”, with a one percent increase in the 
independent variable; the logit refers the log odds of the dependent variable being equal to “1”, 
with a one unit increase in the independent variable. Still, through an additional command, the 
logit reports also the “odds”, i.e. the ratio of the probability of success and the probability of 
failure for a given independent variable regarding its effect on the dependent variable. Thus, 
since both dependent variables are dichotomous, a probit and logit model are used to estimate 
the two regression models considered, at first. Additionally, they are both controlled for 
heteroscedasticity with the robust option provided by Stata.  
Nevertheless, the marginal impact of the independent variable’s change is not constant. While 
in the OLS estimator the marginal effect is the same at every observation of a specific variable 
(the slope of the regression line remains constant for each observation), the probit and logit 
estimators refer to an unobserved dependent variable. The only interpretation we can take is the 
direction of the average effect. Hence, a marginal analysis is performed, allowing the 
interpretation of the predicted probability of the dependent variable given the coefficient of the 
variable of interest. By default, Stata reports Marginal effects at the Means, i.e. the marginal 
effect of one variable at the other independent variables’ mean.  
However, this dissertation considers the Average Marginal Effects. Instead of considering the 
other variables at their average values (i.e. considering the average of dummy variables), it 
compares for each specific variable two hypothetical populations (the one assuming “1” and 
the one assuming “0”) that have the same values on the remaining independent variables. Thus, 
the only difference between the two populations is the specific variable analyzed and it must be 
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4. Empirical Analysis and Results  
 
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
The tables presented below include general summary statistics (Table I), summary statistics by 
constraints (Table II), as well as the correlation coefficients (Table III). Nevertheless, summary 
statistics by Country (Appendix 3), Firm industry (Appendix 4) and Size (Appendix 5) are also 
mentioned and presented in the appendix.   
Taking into consideration the general summary statistics (Table I), Panel A, which presents the 
capital structure variables, demonstrates that only 14,5% of SMEs have increased their 
proportion of debt to assets. However, BankLoan have increased in 42,7% of SMEs. Hence, it 
is important to understand that the capital structure proxy variable, i.e. DebtoAssets, includes 
not only bank loans but also other components such as trade credit and credit overdraft, and not 
all the firms in the sample took new loans or draw on credit lines, bank overdraft or credit cards 
overdraft in the period of analysis.  
From Panel B, which represents the access to external finance variables, it is possible to see 
from the supply side that its terms and conditions have not increased for most SMEs in Europe. 
FeesandComiss stands out as the variable where more firms (28,0%) revealed that have 
increased in the last 6 months before the questionnaire. The size of the loan, proxied by 
LoanSize, other conditions (i.e. guarantees, information requirements, procedures, time 
required for loan approval or loan covenants) proxied by OtherCond and collaterals, proxied 
by Collat are the subsequent variables that increased the most among firms. Regarding the 
demand side, the firms’ own capital reveals to be the variable in which more firms reported an 
improvement in the last 6 months before the questionnaire (30,4%). Even with low percentages 
among firms, improvements in credit history, proxied by CreditHist and general economic 
outlook, proxied by GenEconOutlook, are the highest after OwnCapital.  
In Panel C, where control variables are considered, profit, fixed investment and inventories and 
working capital are highlighted since the remaining control variables are categorical variables 
that will be analyzed below. Hence, it is possible to conclude that 34,4%, 28,7% and 22,3% of 







General Summary Statistics 
Table I reports the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the regression analysis, aggregated into panels. Panel A presents the changes of capital 
structure proxies for SMES in Europe. Panel B contains the variables that try to explain the impact of access to external finance on capital structure, both 
the supply and demand side. Panel C includes also the control variables considered influential on capital structure of firms by literature (Profit, FixedInvest, 
IWC). For the sake of simplicity, this table does not display all the control variables considered in the regressions, but they all are presented in Appendix 2. 
The summary statistics are presented as follows: number of observations, mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values, kurtosis, skewness, and 
quartiles 25, 50, 75 and 90. 
Variables Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min Max Kurtosis Skewness p25 p50 p75 p90 
Panel A: Capital Structure Variables 
DebtoAssets 16 916 0,1452 0,3524 0 1 5,0547 2,0136 0 0 0 1 
BankLoan 8 176 0,4267 0,4946 0 1 1,0877 0,2963 0 0 1 1 
Panel B: Access to External Finance 
GenEconOutlook 16 916 0,2231 0,4163 0 1 2,7694 1,3302 0 0 0 1 
AccessPubFin 16 916 0,0701 0,2552 0 1 12,3504 3,3690 0 0 0 0 
OwnCapital 16 916 0,3044 0,4602 0 1 1,7224 0,8499 0 0 1 1 
CreditHist 16 916 0,2521 0,4342 0 1 2,3034 1,1417 0 0 1 1 
IntRate 4 878 0,1501 0,3572 0 1 4,8405 1,9597 0 0 0 1 
FeesandComiss 4 878 0,2798 0,4490 0 1 1,9622 0,9809 0 0 1 1 
LoanSize 4 878 0,2386 0,4263 0 1 2,5041 1,2264 0 0 0 1 
LoanMat 4 878 0,1015 0,3020 0 1 7,9675 2,6396 0 0 0 1 
Collat 4 878 0,2015 0,4012 0 1 3,2147 1,4882 0 0 0 1 
OtherCond 4 878 0,2271 0,4190 0 1 2,6964 1,3025 0 0 0 1 
Panel C: Control Variables 
Profit 16 916 0,3441 0,4751 0 1 1,4310 0,6565 0 0 1 1 
FixedInvest 16 916 0,2871 0,4524 0 1 1,8862 0,9414 0 0 1 1 
IWC 16 916 0,2230 0,4163 0 1 2,7716 1,3310 0 0 0 1 
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When summarizing variable statistics by country (Appendix 3), most observations come from 
Germany, France and Italy. Regarding the access to external finance variables, (i) the demand 
variables that have the major improvements among countries are GenEconOutlook and 
CreditHist; while (ii) the supply variables with the major increases among countries are 
FeesandComiss and LoanSize. Considering summary statistics by industry (Appendix 4), most 
of SMEs are from Trade and Services sectors. Nevertheless, DebtoAssets and BankLoan report 
similar increase frequency between sectors. When analyzing the access to external finance 
variables, (i) in the demand side variables, OwnCapital has the highest number of 
improvements together with CreditHist; while (ii) the supply variables that have increased the 
most are FeesandComiss and OtherCond. Regarding the SMEs’ size, summary statistics 
(Appendix 5) suggest that most of SMEs surveyed are micro, followed by small and medium 
firms. This is consistent with the fact that large firms are included only as a small control group. 
Nevertheless, DebtoAssets and BankLoan, as dependent variables, present more increases for 
large and medium sizes. Considering the access to external finance variables, (i) the demand 
side presents OwnCapital and CreditHist as the variables with the larger improvements across 
size categories; while (ii) for the supply variables of interest, the variables that have increased 
the most are FeesandComiss and OtherCond. 
Finally, the third hypothesis of this dissertation aims to understand how the access to external 
finance varies with financial constraints. In order to analyze it, the sample used in this 
dissertation is split in two sub-samples: (i) Unconstrained SMEs and (ii) Constrained SMEs, 
based on SMEs’ success in their application to external sources of financing. Hence, from Table 
II, it is possible to understand that the sample contains more constrained firms than 
unconstrained firms. As expectable, unconstrained firms increase on average more 11,4% 
leverage than constrained firms, when measured throughout DebtoAssets, and 37% more, when 
considering BankLoan. When analyzing the access to external finance variables, the demand 
side highlights OwnCapital and CreditHist as the variables with more improvements for both 
unconstrained (34,4% and 34,1%, respectively) and constrained (28,7% and 21,2%, 
respectively). Nevertheless, these variables have improved less for constrained firms, as could 
be expected. Regarding the supply side, FeesandComiss is the variable with more increase 
frequency, both for unconstrained (23,7%) and constrained (41,7%) firms. With the same 
reasoning, fees and commissions increased more for constrained firms, as expected given their 
condition.  
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 Table II 
 
Table II 
Summary Statistics by Constraints  
Table II presents the changes in the capital structure proxy (DebtoAssets and BankLoan) as well as the access to external finance explanatory 
variables. Both variables that are a proxy for the demand side (GenEconOutlook, AccessPubFin, OwnCapital and CreditHist) and supply side 
(IntRate, FeesandComiss, LoanSize, LoanMat, Collat and OtherCond) are presented. The number of observations and the mean values are presented 
for these variables, according to the firms constraints. The subgroups Unconstrained and Constrained firms define how successful firms were in 
getting the external finance they applied for, i.e. (i) bank loans, (ii) credit line, bank overdraft or credit line overdraft, (iii) trade credit or (iv) other 
external finance. Hence, Unconstrained firms were successful in getting at least one source of external finance. The coefficients’ significance was 
tested with a t-test, whose mean-difference is also presented. The following sign applies for the statistical significance of coefficients: * p<0,01. 
Variables 
Unconstrained Firms  Constrained Firms Mean Difference 
(Constrained – 
Unconstrained) Obs. Mean  Obs. Mean 
DebtoAssets 5 279 0,2237  11 637 0,1097 -0,1141* 
BankLoan 3 667 0,6310  4 509 0,2606 -0,3704* 
GenEconOutlook 5 279 0,2917  11 637 0,1920 -0,0997* 
AccessPubFin 5 279 0,0960  11 637 0,0583 -0,0378* 
OwnCapital 5 279 0,3436  11 637 0,2867 -0,0570* 
CreditHist 5 279 0,3412  11 637 0,2117 -0,1294* 
IntRate 3 719 0,1223  1 159 0,2390 0,1167* 
FeesandComiss 3 719 0,2372  1 159 0,4167 0,1796* 
LoanSize 3 719 0,2640  1 159 0,1570 -0,1070* 
LoanMat 3 719 0,1086  1 159 0,0785 -0,0301* 
Collat 3 719 0,1560  1 159 0,3477 0,1918* 
OtherCond 3 719 0,1772  1 159 0,3874 0,2102* 
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Looking at the correlation matrix (Table III), the dependent variables that try to represent 
changes in SMEs capital structures vary with the variables of interest, i.e. variables selected to 
represent the access to external finance.  
Generally, all the variables have low linear correlation between them. If we consider the 
dependent variables (DebtoAssets and BankLoan), the increase in one will increase the other 
by 15,3%. Analyzing access to external finance variables, it is observable that supply side is 
the group of variables that are mostly correlated with the dependent variables, specifically 
DebtoAssets. If supply side variables increase, i.e. IntRate, FeesandComiss, LoanSize, 
LoanMat, Collat or OtherCond, DebtoAssets will increase by 8,7% (IntRate), 13,4% 
(FeesandComiss); 7,4% (LoanSize); 4,8% (LoanMat); 12,4% (Collat) or 11,5% (OtherCond). 
Nevertheless, BankLoan dependent variables presents lower correlations with the same 
explanatory variables. Considering BankLoan, LoanSize and LoanMat are the variables most 
correlated with the dependent variable, leading them to increase by 10,4% and 8,1%, 
respectively. Hence, based on the correlation matrix results, it is expected that increases on the 
availability of size and maturity of loans will increase the usage of Bank Loans by SMEs. Table 
III
Table III 
Correlation matrix between Capital Structure and Access to External Finance variables  
Table III reports the correlation between the variables that represent the changes in capital 
structure of SMEs in Europe (DebtoAssets and BankLoan) and the ones that try to explain the 
impact of access to external finance on them. Hence both variables that are a proxy for the  
demand side (GenEconOutlook, AccessPubFin, OwnCapital  and CreditHist) and supply side 
(IntRate, FeesandComiss, LoanSize, LoanMat, Collat and OtherCond) are presented. For the 
sake of simplicity, this table does not display the control variables considered in the regressions, 
but they are all presented in Appendix 6. The following sign applies for the statistical significance 
of coefficients: * p<0,05. 
Variables Capital Structure Variables 
DebtoAssets BankLoan 
DebtoAssets 1,0000 0,1527* 
BankLoan 0,1527* 1,0000 
GenEconOutlook (0,0001) 0,0691* 
AccessPubFin 0,0072 0,0244* 
OwnCapital (0,0430)* 0,0387* 
CreditHist 0,0021 0,0671* 
IntRate 0,0869* (0,0004) 
FeesandComiss 0,1335* (0,0496)* 
LoanSize 0,0740* 0,1039* 
LoanMat 0,0481* 0,0809* 
Collat 0,1237* (0,0350)* 
OtherCond 0,1149* (0,0432)* 
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4.2. Probit and average marginal effects   
According to the methodology described in section 3.3, several models were tested in order to 
answer the research questions proposed in section 1.3 and provide conclusions regarding the 
present dissertation framework.  
The variables that represent the demand and supply side were firstly considered in both 
regressions proposed, i.e. regressions (1) and (2). Namely, DebtoAssets and BankLoan were 
considered as a function of all the access to external finance variables. Nevertheless, the 
variables of interest revealed to be more appropriated depending on the dependent variable. 
Thus, DebtoAssets was considered a function of the demand side, generating regression (3), 
while BankLoan was regressed as a function of the supply side variables, generating regression 
(4). The idea is to understand how the demand conditions (GenEconOutlook, AccessPubFin, 
OwnCapital and CreditHist) influence the external finance in general (DebtoAssets) and how 
the terms and conditions to raise bank loans (IntRate, FeesandComiss, LoanSize, LoanMat, 
Collat and OtherCond) influence that specific source of financing (BankLoan). 
Concerning the empirical analysis, even though regressions (3) and (4) revealed from the 
beginning to be the most appropriated to explain changes in SMEs capital structure, regressions 
(1) and (2) were also analyzed in a primary stage, using only the variables of interest. As 
presented in Table IV, regression (1) reveals that OwnCapital and CreditHist are the demand 
conditions that are statistically relevant to explain DebtoAssets changes. An improvement on 
SMEs own capital or credit history has a negative impact on debt change, statistically 
significant at 1% and 5%, respectively. As expected, these results are consistent if logit models 
are used instead of probit models (Appendix 7). Even though their coefficients are different, 
without a marginal analysis, these are the only conclusions that are possible to draw. Hence, 
taking into consideration the average marginal effect, the improvement of SMEs OwnCapital 
and CreditHist decreases the probability of an increase in leverage by 4,7% and 2,9%, 
respectively and holding everything else constant. Supporting hypothesis 1, item (iii), it applies 
also for both models.  
FeesandComiss, LoanSize, Collat and OtherCond are also statistically relevant on DebtoAssets 
changes when considering the supply variables. However, when interpreting the impact of 
FeesandComiss, Collat and OtherCond on leverage changes, we conclude that an increase in 
these variables leads to an increase of DebtoAssets, at 1% significance level for FeesandComiss 
and Collat and at 5% significance level for OtherCond. Hence, besides not appearing consistent 
for the present dissertation, it becomes contradictory to the hypothesis 2, items (ii) and (v). On 
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the other hand, LoanSize is statistically relevant at 1% level, influencing positively 
DebtoAssets.   When analyzing the average marginal effects, the increase of LoanSize increases 
the probability of a positive change in DebtoAssets by 7,7%, holding everything else constant. 
Supporting hypothesis 2, item (iii), it applies also for both models.  
Considering regression (2), also reported in Table IV, Owncapital is the only demand condition 
statistically relevant when influencing changes in BankLoan. An improvement on SMEs 
Owncapital has a positive impact on BankLoan changes, statistically relevant at 1%. Taking 
into consideration the average marginal effect, the improvement of SMEs own capital increases 
the probability of a leverage change by 5,5%. Nevertheless, these results do not support any 
item of hypothesis 1, for both models. Analyzing the supply side variables, FeesandComiss, 
LoanSize and LoanMat reveal to be statistically relevant on BankLoan changes. An increase of 
FeesandComiss has a negative impact on leverage change, at 5% significance level, while an 
increase of LoanSize and LoanMat has a positive impact on leverage change at 1%. When 
considering the average marginal effect, the increase of FeesandComiss, decreases by 4,3% the 
probability of an increase in BankLoan, whereas the increase in the LoanSize or LoanMat 
increases the probability of a positive change in BankLoan by 8,5% and 8,2%, respectively, and 
holding everything else constant. Complying with hypothesis 2, items (ii), (iii) and (iv), these 
results hold for both models. 
When looking at regression (3), it is understandable that demand conditions such as 
GenEconOutlook and AccessPubFin do not impact the change in SMEs debt (DebtoAssets), 
given its non-statistical relevance. However, it is observable that an improvement of SMEs own 
capital has a negative impact on debt change, while an improvement on SMEs credit history 
has a positive impact on changes in their debt levels. These effects are statistically significant 
at 1% and 5% level, respectively. As expected, these impacts are also consistent with the logit 
model. Taking into consideration the average marginal effect, the negative impact of 
Owncapital and the positive impact of CreditHist remain unchanged. Namely, the improvement 
of SMEs Owncapital decreases the probability of an increase in leverage by 4,2%. 
Nevertheless, the improvement of SMEs credit history increases the probability of a leverage 
increase by 1,6%, holding everything else constant. Supporting hypothesis 1, item (iii) and (iv), 
it applies also for both models.  
Concerning the results from regression (4), the supply explanatory variables such as IntRate, 
Collat and OtherCond are not statistical relevant when explaining the changes in BankLoan.  
However, an increase in BankLoan is influenced (i) negatively by FeesandComiss and (ii) 
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positively by LoanSize and LoanMat, at a 1% significance level. As expected, these conclusions 
are also consistent with the logit model. Moreover, when analyzing the average marginal 
effects, the sign impact of the statistical relevant variables of interest remains unchanged. 
Specifically, the increase of FeesandComiss decrease by 4,7% the probability of an increase in 
BankLoan, whereas the increase in the LoanSize or LoanMat increase the probability of a 
positive change in BankLoan by 9,7% and 9,1%, respectively, and holding everything else 
constant. Complying with hypothesis 2, items (ii), (iii) and (iv), these results hold for both 
models. 
Before continuing with the empirical analysis, it is possible to observe the less accurate results 
from regressions (1) and (2), and understand why the later regressions (3) and (4) were used as 
baseline in the remaining of this dissertation. Therefore, only regressions (3) and (4) are 
analyzed and applied throughout the empirical results, as it will be described below. Moreover, 
it is important to highlight that both models, appropriated to study binary and categorical 
variables and used in this dissertation, i.e. probit (Table IV) and logit (Appendix 7) models, 
draw the same conclusions when analyzing the average marginal effects. Even though their 
coefficients differ in their interpretations, when applying the average marginal effects the 





Direct effect of Access to External Finance variables on Capital Structure: probit and average marginal effects  
Table IV reports the probit regressions (1) and (2) from regressing DebtoAssets  and BankLoan  on all the access to external finance variables. The probit 
regressions (3) and (4) are also reported from regressing DebtoAssets  on variables that are a proxy for demand side ( GenEconOutlook, AccessPubFin, 
OwnCapital and CreditHist) and from regressing BankLoan  on variables that are a proxy for the supply side ( IntRate, FeesandComiss, LoanSize, LoanMat, 
Collat and OtherCond ), respectively. The correspondent average marginal effects are also presented in order to allow a correct interpretation of the variables’ 
coefficients. Control variables are not included since the present table aims to report only the direct effect of the variabl es of interest.  The following sign 
applies for the statistical significance of coefficients: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Variables  
 Probit (1) and (2)  Average Marginal Effects   Probit (3) and (4)  Average Marginal Effects  
 DebtoAssets (1)  BankLoan (2)  DebtoAssets  BankLoan  DebtoAssets (3)  BankLoan (4)  DebtoAssets  BankLoan 
GenEconOutlook   (0,0535) 0,0623 (0,0166) 0,0222  0,0144  0,0033  
AccessPubFin   0,0520 0,0200 0,0162 0,0071  0,0582  0,0132  
OwnCapital   (0,1514)***  0,1534*** (0,0471)***  0,0548***  (0,1831)***   (0,0417)***   
CreditHist   (0,0931)**  0,0271 (0,0290)**  0,0097  0,0722**  0,0164**  
IntRate  0,0896 0,0984 0,0279 0,0351   0,0853  0,0305 
FeesandComiss   0,2568*** (0,1216)**  0,0799*** (0,0434)**    (0,1307)***   (0,0468)***  
LoanSize  0,2483*** 0,2376*** 0,0772*** 0,0848***   0,2703***  0,0968*** 
LoanMat  0,1012 0,2284*** 0,0315 0,0815***   0,2552***  0,0914*** 
Collat  0,1975*** (0,0343) 0,0615*** (0,0122)   (0,0463)  (0,0166) 
OtherCond  0,1280019**  (0,0931) 0,0398** (0,0332)   (0,0957)  (0,0343) 
Constant   (0,8107)***  0,3263*** - -  (1,0300)***  0,3982*** - - 
Observations   4 878 3 893    16916 3893 16 916 3 893 
Pseudo R2  0,0323 0,0177 - -  0,0029 0,0144 - - 
Wald chi2   178,77*** 82,83*** - -  41,21 68,63 - - 
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4.3. Additional controls  
After analyzing the impact of the variables of interest on Debtoassets and Bankloan, 
respectively, several additional control variations were added in order to understand the 
consistency of the results described above. Here the same regressions (3) and (4) analyzed 
above, were estimated but complemented with the control variables, as reported in Table V. 
The control variables added to the regressions were a set of categorical variables, specifically 
(i) Country, (ii) Firm Industry, (iii) Ownership, (iv) Maturity, (v) Size. Moreover, three binary 
variables that try to represent the continuous variables usually considered by the literature 
review when studying capital structure changes, were added i.e. (i) Profit, (ii) Fixed Investment 
and (iii) Net Working Capital. Notice that these former variables are binary variables that 
represent the change of the underlying concept for SMEs.  
From Table V, demand conditions and its relation with DebtoAssets remained unchanged. 
Specifically, the GenEconOutolook and the AccessPubFin do not impact the change in debt, 
given their statistical insignificance, whereas SMEs’ OwnCapital and CreditHist remain 
relevant statistically speaking. Besides their impact signs (i.e. negative and positive, 
respectively) remaining the same, their average marginal effects remain almost the same. 
Hence, the probability of SMEs increase the debt to assets is 4,1% for firms that improved their 
OwnCapital and 1,6% for firms that improved their CreditHist, holding all the other 
explanatory variables constant. Thus, hypothesis 1, item (iii) and (iv) are still validated. 
Nevertheless, when looking at the supply side variables and their impact on BankLoan, i.e. 
regression (2), a change in the explanatory variables is observable. With the introduction of all 
the control variables mentioned, Collat and OtherCond remain statically irrelevant, while 
IntRate becomes statistically relevant. Nevertheless, when interpreting IntRate impact on 
leverage changes, we conclude that an increase in the IntRate leads to an increase of BankLoan 
by SMEs. Hence, besides not appearing relevant for the present dissertation, it becomes 
contradictory to the hypothesis 2, item (i) raised in section 1.3. 
On the other hand, FeesandComiss, LoanSize and LoanMat remain statistically relevant as well 
as their impact on leverage changes. An increase in BankLoan is influenced (i) negatively by 
FeesandComiss, at 10% significance level and (ii) positively by LoanSize and LoanMat, at a 
1% significance level. Yet, when analyzing the average marginal effects, their impact on 
leverage changes diminishes. Namely, the increase in FeesandComiss decrease by 3,1% the 
probability of a positive change in BankLoan, while the increase of LoanSize or LoanMat, 
increases by 7,6% and 8,9% the probability of an increase in BankLoan, respectively and 
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holding everything else constant. Hence, these supply variables still support hypothesis 2 raised 
in this dissertation, specifically, item (ii), (iii) and (iv). Table V 
 
4.4. Constraints analysis 
Once the main insights regarding how the changes in capital structures are affected by access 
to external finance drivers are presented, it is now possible to understand how the previous 
results hold when taking into consideration constraints faced by SMEs in Europe, i.e. the third 
hypothesis underlying this dissertation. 
In order to study the financial constraints impact on access to external finance and its relation 
with changes in leverage, UnconstDebt variable was generated. Taking into consideration 
SMEs that succeed in their applications to external sources of financing and SMEs that did not 
succeed, the former variable assumes “1” or “0”, respectively, and the sample used in this 
dissertation is split in two sub-samples: (i) Unconstrained SMEs and (ii) Constrained SMEs.  
Table V 
Regressions results with control variables: probit and average marginal effects 
Table V reports the probit regressions (3) and (4) from regressing DebtoAssets on variables that are 
a proxy for demand side (GenEconOutlook, AccessPubFin, OwnCapital and CreditHist) and from 
regressing BankLoan on variables that are a proxy for the supply side (IntRate, FeesandComiss, 
LoanSize, LoanMat, Collat and OtherCond), respectively. The average marginal effects are also 
presented, allowing a correct interpretation of the variables’ coefficients. For the sake of simplicity, 
this table does not display the control variables considered in the regressions, but they are all 
presented in Appendix 8.1. The following sign applies for the statistical significance of coefficients: 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Variables 
 Probit (3) and (4)  Average Marginal Effects 
 DebtoAssets (3) BankLoan (4)  DebtoAssets BankLoan 
GenEconOutlook  (0,0008)   (0,0002)  
AccessPubFin  0,0142   0,0032  
OwnCapital  (0,1852)***   (0,0411)***  
CreditHist  0,0615**   0,0136**  
IntRate   0,1295**   0,0453** 
FeesandComiss   (0,0881)*   (0,0308)* 
LoanSize   0,2164***   0,0756*** 
LoanMat   0,2551***   0,0891*** 
Collat   (0,0314)   (0,0110) 
OtherCond   (0,0867)   (0,0303) 
Constant  (1,2366)*** 0,1041  - - 
Observations  16 916 3893  16 916 3893 
Pseudo R2  0,0282 0,0371  - - 
Wald chi2  382,39*** 178,28***  - - 
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When looking at the results of the sample divided by the UnconstDebt variable (Table VI), it is 
observable changes in the demand conditions regarding their statistic relevance on leverage’s 
changes. GenEconOutlook, AccessPubFin and CreditHist do not reveal any impact on 
DebtoAssets for both Unconstrained and Constrained SMEs sub-samples, whereas in the 
baseline model (3) only GenEconOutlook and AccessPubFin were statistically insignificant. 
Hence, only OwnCapital hold its negative impact on changes in leverage for both sub-samples, 
at 1% significance level. When comparing its average marginal effect with the baseline model, 
it is possible to conclude that OwnCapital has a bigger impact on Unconstrained SMEs, but 
smaller in the Constrained sub-sample. Namely, the improvement of OwnCapital decrease by 
5,8% the probability of an increase in DebtoAssets for Unconstrained SMEs, while the 
probability of an increase in leverage for Constrained SMEs is only 2,9%. 
Considering the supply variables and their impact on BankLoan capital structure variable, 
Unconstrained SMEs keep the same relevant variables as the baseline model (4) in explaining 
the impact on BankLoan, i.e. IntRate, FeesandComiss, LoanSize and LoanMat. Collat and 
OtherCond are once again excluded, given their statistical irrelevance. Moreover, keeping the 
same impact signs on bank loans, their average marginal effects compared to the baseline model 
(4) reveal that IntRate and FeesandComiss have a higher impact and LoanSize and LoanMat a 
smaller impact for Unconstrained SMEs. Namely, the increase of IntRate, LoanSize or LoanMat 
increases the probability of an increase in BankLoans by 5,8%, 4% and 6,5%, respectively. An 
increase of FeesandComiss decreases the probability of an increase in leverage by 3,4%.  
On the other hand, Constrained SMEs reveal that changes in BankLoan are influenced by 
LoanSize, Loan Mat and Collat, excluding IntRate, FeesandComiss and OtherCond, given their 
statistical irrelevance. Even though the supply variables statistically relevant in explaining the 
dependent variable differ from the base line model (4), the ones in common, i.e. LoanSize and 
LoanMat keep the same impact signs. Moreover, when comparing their average marginal effect 
with the baseline model, LoanSize and LoanMat reveal a higher impact for Constrained SMEs. 
Specifically, an increase of LoanSize or LoanMat increases the probability of a positive change 
in BankLoan by 11,6% and 11,7%, respectively. Collat reveal to have also a positive impact of 
8% on the same probability.  
Hence, after analyzing Table VI, it is possible to conclude that hypothesis 3 raised in this 
dissertation is validated. For the sample available in SAFE, the impact of the access to external 
finance by SMEs in Europe differs if they are constrained or unconstrained. Regarding the 
demand conditions representing the access to finance and influence leverage structures, 
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improvements on OwnCapital, the only statistical significant variable, has its major effect on 
Unconstrained firms leverage variations when compared to the baseline model (3). 
Nevertheless, when looking at supply variables and taking into consideration the ones in 
common between the Unconstrained and Constrained SMEs sub-samples, LoanSize and 







Regressions results based on success on external finance applications: average marginal effects 
Table VI reports the probit regression average marginal effects resulting from a sample split based on UnconstDebt variable. If SMEs succeed in 
their application to external sources they are classified as unconstrained SMEs, whereas if the failed in their application they are considered 
constrained SMEs. Both regressions, DebtoAssets and BankLoan, on access to external finance variables are presented as well as their 
correspondent base line regressions, (3) and (4), respectively.  Even though the control variables are not reported, they were considered in the 
regressions, and they are all presented in Appendix 8.2. For the sake of simplicity, this table does not report the probit regression coefficients (that 
only indicate the direction of the average effect), the constant, the pseudo r-squared and the significance of the whole regression (Wald chi-
squared). The following sign applies for the statistical significance of coefficients: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Variables 
 DebtoAssets  BankLoan 
 Unconstrained SMEs 
Constrained 





GenEconOutlook  (0,0169) (0,0011) (0,0002)     
AccessPubFin  (0,0044) 0,0027 0,0032     
OwnCapital  (0,0580)*** (0,0286)*** (0,0411)***     
CreditHist  0,0045 0,0007 0,0136**     
IntRate      0,0577** 0,0373 0,0453** 
FeesandComiss      (0,0343)* 0,0258 (0,0308)* 
LoanSize      0,0400** 0,1164*** 0,0756*** 
LoanMat      0,0646** 0,1172** 0,0891*** 
Collat      (0,0203) 0,0802** (0,0110) 
OtherCond      (0,0030) (0,0013) (0,0303) 
Observations  5279 11637 16916  2953 939 3893 
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5. Robustness  
In order to test the accuracy of the conclusions drawn above, different factors were taken into 
consideration. Hence through different scenarios, we aim to test if there are significant 
differences in the regression results and consequently in the inferences made about the access 
to finance impact on changes on capital structures.  
 
5.1. SMEs dimension analysis  
The database used in this dissertation – the SAFE questionnaire – has its focus on small and 
medium enterprises. Nevertheless, there are a small proportion of firms that are considered 
large, i.e. 250 or more employees. We believe this is a measure of control used by the 
questionnaire, but that will be disregarded as a measure of robustness.  
In order to consider this, NoLarge variable was generated, assuming “1” if the categorical 
variable size assumes “Micro”, “Small”, or “Medium”; and “0” if size is “Large”. Hence, based 
on NoLarge variable a new sample was considered, i.e. excluding large firms from the sample. 
Considering the results of this alteration in the sample composition (Table VII), demand 
conditions and their impact on DebtoAssets remained unchanged. GenEconOutlook and 
AccessPubFin, remaining statistically insignificant, do not impact changes in debt. On the other 
hand, OwnCapital and CreditHist persist statistically relevant at 1% and 5%, respectively. 
Considering their impact signs, which remained the same, it is possible to conclude that the 
new sample, excluding the large firms, revealed a higher impact on DebtoAssets changes. 
Namely, the probability of SMEs increase their DebtoAssets is 4,4% for firms that improved 
their OwnCapital and 1,6% for firms that improved their CreditHist, holding the remaining 
explanatory variables constant. Hence, the hypothesis 1, item (iii) and (iv) are still validated.  
However, when taking into consideration the supply side variables and their relation with 
changes in BankLoan, there is a change in the relevance of explanatory variables. Collat and 
OtherCond continue statistically irrelevant, while FeesandComiss become statistically 
irrelevant when excluding large firms from the sample. Nonetheless, IntRate, LoanSize and 
LoanMat, which hold their positive impact, reveal a higher positive impact on leverage changes. 
Specifically, an increase of IntRate, LoanSize and LoanMat increase by 4,9%, 7,8% and 10,3% 
the probability of an increase in BankLoan, respectively and holing everything else constant. 
Once again, IntRate having a positive relevant impact on leverage changes does not seem 
relevant for the present dissertation, becoming again contradictory to the hypothesis 2, item (i) 
raised in section 1.3. Yet, LoanSize and LoanMat still support hypothesis 2 raised in this 
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dissertation, specifically, item (iii) and (iv). 
Therefore, it is possible to conclude that the impact of the access to external finance on SMEs’ 
capital structure differs when excluding the largest firms in the sample. When considering the 
demand conditions, both variables remain statistically relevant, increasing their impact for the 
NoLarge firms sub-sample. Regarding the supply side variables that remain relevant between 
the sample with and without large firms, LoanSize and LoanMat reveal a larger impact for the 







Regression results without largest firms: probit and average marginal effects 
Table VII reports the probit regression results from a sample split based on NoLarge variable. If the categorical variable size assumes “Micro”, 
“Small” or “Medium”, NoLarge assumes value “1” and SMEs are considered in the regression, whereas if size assumes “Large”, SMEs are 
disregarded from the regression. Both regressions, DebtoAssets and BankLoan, on access to external finance variables are presented as well as their 
correspondent base line regressions, (3) and (4), respectively.  The average marginal effects are also presented, allowing a correct interpretation of 
the variables’ coefficients. For the sake of simplicity, this table does not display the control variables considered in the regressions, but they are all 
presented in Appendix 9.1. The following sign applies for the statistical significance of coefficients: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Variables 
 Probit  Average Marginal Effects 
 DebtoAssets (3) BankLoan (4)  DebtoAssets (3) BankLoan (4) 
GenEconOutlook  (0,0241) (0,0008)    (0,0053) (0,0002)   
AccessPubFin  0,0090 0,0142    0,0020 0,0032   
OwnCapital  (0,1991)*** (0,1852)***    (0,0438)*** (0,0411)***   
CreditHist  0,0740** 0,0615**    0,0163** 0,0136**   
IntRate    0,1382** 0,1295**    0,0490** 0,0453** 
FeesandComiss    (0,0889) (-0,0881)*    (0,0315) (0,0308)* 
LoanSize    0,2201*** 0,2164***    0,0780*** 0,0756*** 
LoanMat    0,2911*** 0,2551***    0,1032*** 0,0891*** 
Collat    (0,0421) (0,0314)    (0,0149) (0,0110) 
OtherCond    (0,0946) (0,0867)    (0,0335) (0,0303) 
Constant  (1,2308)*** (1,2366)*** 0,0934 0,1041  - - - - 
Observations  15 324 16 916 3 405 3 893  15 324 16 916 3 405 3893 
Pseudo R2  0,0277 0,0282 0,0368 0,0371  - - - - 
Wald chi2  337,06*** 382,39*** 156,73*** 178,28***  - - - - 
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5.2. Access to external finance analysis   
The third hypothesis underling this dissertation aims to assess how differently the access to 
external finance influences capital structure of constrained and unconstrained SMEs. Based on 
the database available, section 4.4. analyzes SMEs constraints throughout the success on firms’ 
applications to external finance. However, the survey offers another more subjective approach 
to define constraints, namely, firms’ self-assessment regarding the access to finance as the most 
pressing problem. When considering it, it does not take into account an objective factor as the 
success on external finance applications but the level of financing problem perceived by the 
firms surveyed. 
Hence, as a measure of robustness, AccesstoFin was generated as a new definition of SMEs 
constraints. Considering firms selecting from 1 to 10, “Access to Finance” as the most pressing 
problem, AccesstoFin splits the sample into two sub-samples: (i) Non-Pressed SMEs, if firms 
select “Access to Finance” as their most pressing problem between 1 and 5; (ii) Pressed SMEs 
if firms select “Access to Finance” as the most pressing problem between 6 and 10. 
When looking at the results of the sample divided by the AccesstoFin variable (Table VIII), 
differences are observable regarding the demand conditions and their statistic relevance 
between Non-pressed and Pressed SMEs. While for Non-pressed firms, GenEconOutlook and 
AccessPubFin do not reveal any impact on DebtoAssets, going in line with the baseline model 
(3), for Pressed firms also CreditHist does not impact DebtoAssets given its statistical 
irrelevance. Thus, only OwnCapital hold its negative impact on changes in leverage for both 
sub-samples, at 1% significance level. Analyzing their average marginal effect, it is observable 
that even though OwnCapital has a lower impact for Non-pressed firms than for Pressed firms, 
it has a lower impact for both sub-samples when compared to the baseline model (3). Namely, 
the improvement of OwnCapital decrease by 2,5% for Non-pressed firms, and by 2,2% for 
Pressed firms, the probability of an increase in DebtoAssets. 
Yet, CreditHist also holds its (positive) impact on changes in leverage for Non-pressed firms, 
at 1% significance level. When comparing its average marginal effect with the baseline model 
(3) it is possible to conclude that CreditHist has a bigger impact on Non-pressed firms. 
Specifically, the improvement of CreditHist increases by 2,2% the probability of an increase in 
DebtoAssets. 
Taking into consideration the supply side variables and their impact on BankLoan, Non-pressed 
firms do not have any relevant variables that could explain changes in this form of leverage. 
On the other hand, Pressed SMEs reveal that changes in BankLoan are influenced by IntRate, 
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LoanSize and LoanMat, excluding FeesandComiss, Collat and OtherCond given their statistical 
irrelevance. Even though supply variables statistical relevant in explaining BankLoan changes 
differ from the baseline model (4), the ones in common (IntRate, LoanSize and LoanMat) hold 
the same positive impact signs. Furthermore, when comparing their average marginal effect 
with the baseline model, IntRate reveals the same impact while LoanSize and LoanMat reveal 
a higher impact for Pressed SMEs. Namely, an increase of LoanSize or LoanMat increases the 
probability of BankLoan changes by 11% and 11,4%, respectively.  
Hence, throughout this analysis, it is also possible to validate hypothesis 3. Regarding the 
demand conditions influencing leverage structures, the improvements on OwnCapital, the only 
common statistical significant variable between sub-samples, has a lower impact for Non-
pressed and Pressed firms when compared with the baseline model (3). Yet, there is still a lower 
impact for DebtoAssets changes in Non-pressed firms than in Pressed firms. Lastly, when 
looking at supply variables, there are no common statistical relevant variables between the two 
subsamples. However, taking a look at Pressed SMEs, LoanSize and LoanMat increases have a 





 Table VIII 
Table VIII 
Regressions results based on access to finance as a pressing problem: average marginal effects 
Table VIII reports the probit regression average marginal effects resulting from a sample split based on AccesstoFin variable. If firms select “Access 
to Finance” as their most pressing problem between 1 and 5 they are classified as Non-Pressed SMEs, whereas if they selected between 6 and 10 
they are considered Pressed SMEs. Both regressions, DebtoAssets and BankLoan, on access to external finance variables are presented as well as 
their correspondent base line regressions, (3) and (4), respectively.  Even though the control variables are not reported, they were considered in the 
regressions, and they are all presented in Appendix 9.2. For the sake of simplicity, this table does not report the probit regression coefficients (that 
only indicate the direction of the average effect), the constant, the pseudo r-squared and the significance of the whole regression (Wald chi-squared). 
The following sign applies for the statistical significance of coefficients: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Variables 
 DebtoAssets  BankLoan 
 Non-Pressed SMEs Pressed SMEs (3)  Non-Pressed SMEs Pressed SMEs (4) 
GenEconOutlook   0,0082      (0,0179)     (0,0002)        
AccessPubFin   (0,0058)     0,0075      0,0032         
OwnCapital   (0,0251)***   (0,0377)***   (0,0411)***  
    
CreditHist   0,0216***   (0,0221)     0,0136**      
IntRate       0,0452      0,0454*   0,0453**  
FeesandComiss       (0,0365)     (0,0174)     (0,0308)*  
LoanSize       0,0369      0,1102***   0,0756***  
LoanMat       0,0573      0,1144***   0,0891***  
Collat       0,0097      (0,0162)     (0,0110)    
OtherCond       (0,0197)     (0,0294)     (0,0303)    
Observations  10 895 6 009  16 916       1 711      2 182      3 893     
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5.3. Country analysis  
So far the location of SMEs has not been considered in the empirical results analysis. However, 
as mentioned by Titman (2002), more than considering debt’s costs and benefits, the market 
conditions and its repercussions on firms financing choices are also a major concern. Hence, 
taking into account the current crisis, how it has affected several countries and how it can be a 
constraint for SMEs, European countries and their macro conditions seemed relevant to 
analyze.  
Therefore, a third robustness test considering the countries mainly affected by the crisis where 
SMEs are located was performed. In order to consider this, CrisisCountries variable was 
generated, assuming “1” if the categorical variable country assumes “Greece”, “Italy”, 
“Ireland”, “Portugal” or “Spain”; and “0” otherwise. Consequently, based on this new variable 
the sample was split into two sub-samples: (i) Crisis countries, and (ii) Non-crisis countries. 
Table IX reports the output from applying the baseline models (3) and (4) to these sub-sample 
groups. Hence, analyzing the results presented, demand conditions and their impact on 
DebtoAssets remained the same when compared to baseline model (3). GenEconOutlook and 
AccessPubFin, persisting statistically insignificant for both crisis and non-crisis countries, do 
not impact changes in debt. On the other hand, OwnCapital continue statistically relevant for 
crisis countries at 1% and for non-crisis countries at 5%. Holding its negative impact on changes 
in leverage for both sub-samples, its average marginal effects reveal that OwnCapital has 
similar impact on crisis countries and non-crisis countries when compared to the baseline 
model. Namely, the improvement of OwnCapital decreases the probability of an increase in 
DebtoAssets by 4,2% and 4% for crisis and non-crisis countries, respectively. 
Nevertheless, CreditHist also holds its (positive) impact on changes in leverage for non-crisis 
countries firms, at 1% significance level. When comparing its average marginal effect with the 
baseline model (3) it is possible to conclude that CreditHist has a bigger impact on non-crisis. 
Explicitly, the probability of an increase in DebtoAssets increases by 1,8% with the 
improvement of CreditHist. 
When considering the supply side variables and its impact on BankLoan changes, there is a 
modification in the relevance of the explanatory variables. Regarding the sub-sample crisis 
countries, not only Collat and OtherCond continue statistically irrelevant, but also IntRate and 
FeesandComiss become statistically irrelevant. Nevertheless, LoanSize and LoanMat, holding 
a positive impact, reveal a higher and lower positive impact on leverage changes, respectively, 
when compared to the baseline model (4). Namely, an increase of LoanSize and LoanMat 
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increase by 10,6% and 8,4% the probability of an increase in BankLoan, respectively and 
holding everything else constant. 
Considering the Non-crisis countries, Collat, OtherCond and FeesandComiss are also not 
relevant when trying to explain changes in BankLoan. On the other hand, IntRate, LoanSize and 
LoanMat hold the same impact sign, at 1% significance level, when compared with the baseline 
model (4). Additionally, when analyzing their average marginal effects, IntRate and LoanMat 
reveal a higher impact on BankLoan compared with the baseline model, while LoanSize reveals 
a lower impact. Specifically, an increase of IntRate, LoanMat and LoanSize increases the 
probability of a positive change in BankLoan by 8,1%, 9,1% and 6,1%, respectively. 
Once again, after analyzing Table IX, it is possible to conclude that hypothesis 3 is validated. 
When considering countries affected by the crisis, the impact of the access to external finance 
by SMEs in Europe differs. Regarding the demand conditions, even though OwnCapital (the 
only statistical significant variable for both sub-samples) has very similar impacts across 
samples, it has its major effect on crisis countries’ leverage variations when compared to the 
baseline model (3). Nevertheless, when looking at supply variables and taking into 
consideration the ones in common between sub-samples, LoanSize increases has a bigger 
impact on crisis countries while LoanMat increases has a bigger impact on non-crisis firms, 




Regressions results based on impact of crisis on European countries: average marginal effects 
Table IX reports the probit regression average marginal effects resulting from a sample split based on CrisisCountries variable. If the 
categorical variable country assumes “Greece”, “Italy”, “Ireland”, “Portugal” or “Spain”, CrisisCountries assumes value “1” and SMEs are 
included in Crisis countries sub-sample. If the country does not correspond to the specific countries, SMEs are included in Non-crisis countries 
sub-sample. Both regressions, DebtoAssets and BankLoan, on access to external finance variables are presented as well as their correspondent 
base line regressions, (3) and (4), respectively.  Even though the control variables are not reported, they were considered in the regressions, 
and they are all presented in Appendix 9.3. For the sake of simplicity, this table does not report the probit regression coefficients (that only 
indicate the direction of the average effect), the constant, the pseudo r-squared and the significance of the whole regression (Wald chi-squared). 
The following sign applies for the statistical significance of coefficients: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Variables 
 DebtoAssets  BankLoan 
 Crisis countries Non-crisis countries (3)  Crisis countries Non-crisis countries (4) 
GenEconOutlook   (0,0204)     0,0038      (0,0002)        
AccessPubFin   (0,0355)     0,0197      0,0032         
OwnCapital   (0,0417)**   (0,0404)***   (0,0411)***      
CreditHist   (0,0054)     0,0184***   0,0136**      
IntRate       (0,0279)     0,0810***   0,0453**  
FeesandComiss       (0,0121)     (0,0336)     (0,0308)*  
LoanSize       0,1056***   0,0614***   0,0756***  
LoanMat       0,0841*   0,0913***   0,0891***  
Collat       (0,0053)     (0,0140)     (0,0110)    
OtherCond       (0,0296)     (0,0271)     (0,0303)    




This dissertation examines the impact of the access to external financing on the capital structure 
of firms, namely SMEs in Europe. Based on the SAFE database from ECB, it tests whether 
firms, which have access to supply of debt (supply side) and have characteristics that raises the 
net benefits of debt (demand side), become more leveraged. Moreover, it also examines whether 
the impact of access to external finance on capital structures differs between unconstrained and 
constrained SMEs. 
When looking at the regression outputs, it is understandable that regarding the demand 
conditions that could influence changes in leverage, improvements in SMEs own capital and in 
their credit history have the major impact. Hence improvements in own capital lead to decreases 
in the leverage levels, while improvements in credit history increase the leverage levels. On the 
other hand, when considering the supply side, capital structure changes are mainly explained 
for changes in fees and commissions, loan size and loan maturity. Thus, an increase of fees and 
commissions leads to decreases in leverage, while increases of loan size and maturity allow 
SMEs to increase their leverage. Nevertheless, after controlling for the SMEs dimension, there 
is only one factor of the demand conditions that explains changes in capital structure, i.e. own 
capital. Considering the supply side only loan size and loan maturity remain relevant, but with 
a larger impact, when explaining changes in capital structure of SMEs.   
Additionally, when taking into consideration constraints faced by SMEs, defined as their 
success/failure when applying for external financing, it validates the third hypothesis of this 
dissertation. Considering the demand conditions, own capital improvements decrease more the 
unconstrained firms’ capital leverage levels than constrained firms. On the other hand, 
regarding the supply variables, increases in loan size and loan maturity have a major positive 
impact on constrained firms’ capital structure than unconstrained. Hence, this is consistent with 
the main findings of Campello et al (2010), who argue that constrained firms tend to use internal 
funding to deal with financial crises, and tend to get credit from the bank, preparing for limited 
access to credit in the future.  
However, when controlling for constraints, two additional approaches were taken, (i) Access to 
Finance as a limiting factor and (ii) Crisis countries analysis. Regarding the access to finance, 
as a more subjective variable, the demand conditions, i.e. the own capital improvements have 
a higher negative impact on leverage changes for pressed firms (firms that find access to finance 
an extremely limiting factor) than for non-pressed firms. While for the supply variables no 
conclusion between sub-samples could be taken. Concerning the countries mainly affected by 
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the crisis, improvements in the own capital of SMEs have very similar impacts between the two 
groups. For the supply side, loan size has its major positive impact on crisis countries, while 
loan maturity does it for non-crisis countries.  
Nonetheless, it is possible to conclude that regardless the measure of constraints used, demand 
and supply factors representing access to external finance differ between the constrained and 
unconstrained sub-sample, when analyzing changes in their leverage ratios.  Hence, as 
mentioned by Rajan and Zingales (1995), the outcomes support the complex interaction of 





7. Limitations and Future Research   
 
7.1. Limitations  
The present dissertation uses as database the SAFE survey. Exploiting the survey, it offers a 
different view regarding how access to external finance impacts capital structures for such a 
difficult topic regarding information availability, as it is for SMEs. However, it measures 
managers’ opinions. Considering what the owner of the firms believes it is the right answer 
may have some distortions from reality. Hence, data from a survey is usually associated with 
potential biases and measurement problems, which can distort the results.  
Additionally, the survey conducts an array of questions that try to approach how is the access 
to external finance for SMEs. Selecting the most appropriate range of questions is somehow 
limitative. Even though the present dissertation considers the more objective questions, 
disregarding the more subjective, it is possible that selecting different questions to generate the 
same variables would lead to different results.  
Lastly, the present dissertation had only access to one year of the survey (2015, first wave). 
Even though it compiles a lot of statistical information about Small and Medium Enterprises 
among the 28 European countries in each survey’s wave, it is not possible to perform a temporal 
analysis. Moreover, besides not having access to the remaining datasets, the SMEs range that 
is surveyed changes every year, which limits the former analysis. 
 
7.2. Future Research 
Considering the limitations just described, the use of the survey could be improved. Besides 
selecting different questions to represent similar variables, the use of continuous variables 
would probably improve the explanatory of the model. Even though we do not have access to 
the SMEs identity, there is a code associated to each one that allows us to understand the 
industry level in which they are inserted. Considering also some general questions (e.g. country, 
number of employees, profitability, etc.) and replicating it with continuous variables through a 
different data source would control for the subjective biases underlying the answers to the 
questions. 
Nevertheless, the research could also be improved if data for more years was considered. 
Having comparable data for both crisis and recovering period would be the ideal. However, if 
the SMEs surveyed change, considering the two waves for each year, could already improve 
the conclusions. 
 45 
8. References  
Articles, Books, Working Papers and Dissertations consulted 
Auerbach, A. J. (1985). Real Determinants of Corporate Leverage. In Corporate Capital 
Structures in the United States (pp. 301-324). Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press. 
Baker, M., and Wurgler, J. (2002). Market Timing and Capital Structure. The Journal of 
Finance, 57(1), 1-32. 
Bradley, Michael, Gregg A. Jarrell, and E. Kim. (1984). On the existence of an optimal capital 
structure: Theory and evidence. The Journal of Finance, 39(3), 857-878.  
Campello M, Graham J. R., and Harvey C. R. (2010). The Real Effects of Financial Constraints: 
Evidence from a Financial Crisis. Journal of Financial Economics, 97(3), 470- 487.  
DeAngelo, H. and Masulis, R. W. (1980). Optimal Capital Structure under Corporate and 
Personal Taxation. Journal of Financial Economics, 8(1), 3-29. 
Easterbrook, F. H. (1984). Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends. The American 
Economic Review, 74(4), 650-659. 
Fama, E. R., and French, K. R. (2002). Testing Trade-off and Pecking Order Predictions About 
Dividends and Debt. Review of Financial Studies, 15(1), 1-33. 
Fama, E. F., and Miller, M. H. (1972). The Theory of Finance. New York, NY: Holt, Rinehart 
and Winston. 
Faulkender, M., and Petersen M. A. (2005). Does the source of capital affect capital structure?. 
Review of Financial Studies, 19(1), 45-79. 
Ferrando, A., and Griesshaber, N. (2011). Financing Obstacles Among Euro Area Firms: Who 
Suffers the Most?. ECB Working Paper, 1293. Retrieved from 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1757728## 
Frank, M. Z., and Goyal, V. K. (2003). Testing the Pecking Order Theory of Capital Structure. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 67(2), 217-248.  
Graham, J. R. (2000). How Big Are the Tax Benefits of Debt?. The Journal of Finance, 55(5), 
1901–1941. 
Harris, M., and Raviv, A. (1991). The Theory of Capital Structure. The Journal of Finance, 
46(1), 297-355.  
 46 
Holton, S., Lawless, M., and McCann, F. (2012). Firm Credit in Europe: A Tale of Three Crises. 
Central Bank of Ireland. Retrieved from 
http://www.centralbank.ie/publications/documents/04rt12.pdf 
Jalilvand, A., and Harris, R. S. (1984). Corporate Behavior in Adjusting to Capital Structure 
and Dividend Targets: An Econometric Study. The Journal of Finance, 39(1), 127-145. 
Jensen, M. C., and Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency 
costs, and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305-360. 
Jensen, M. C. (1986). Agency Cost of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers. 
American Economic Review, 76(2), 323-329. 
Kester, W. C. (1986). Capital and Ownership Structure: A Comparison of United States and 
Japanese Manufacturing Corporations. Financial Management, 15(1), 5-16. 
Korajczyk, R. A., and Levy, A. (2003). Capital Structure Choice: Macroeconomic Conditions 
and Financial Constraints. Journal of Financial Economics, 68(1), 75-109. 
Leary, M. T., and Roberts, M. R. (2005). Do Firms Rebalance Their Capital Structures?. 
Journal of Finance, 60(6), 2575-2620. 
Levy, M. T. (2009). Bank Loan Supply, Lender Choice, and Corporate Capital Structure. The 
Journal of Finance, 64(3), 1143-1185 
Long, M. S., and Malitz, I. B. (1985). Investment Patterns and Financial Leverage. In Corporate 
Capital Structures in the United States (pp. 325-352). Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago 
Press. 
Marsh, P. (1982). The Choice Between Equity and Debt: An Empirical Study. The Journal of 
Finance, 37(1), 121-144.  
Miller, M. H., and Scholes, M. S. (1978). Dividends and Taxes. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 6(4), 333-364. 
Myers, S. C. (1977). Determinants of corporate borrowing. Journal of Financial Economics, 
5(2), 147-175. 
Myers, S. C. (1984). The Capital Structure Puzzle. The Journal of Finance, 39(3), 575-592.  
Myers, S. (2003). Financing of corporations. Handbooks of the Economics of Finance, 1(A), 
215-253. 
 47 
Miller, M. H., and Modigliani, F. (1958). The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the 
Theory of Investment. The American Economic Review, 48(3), 261-297.  
Modigliani, F., and Miller, M. (1963). Corporate Income Taxes and the Cost of Capital: a 
Correction. The American Economic Review, 53(3), 433-443. 
Majluf, N. S., and Myers, S. C. (1984). Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When 
Firms Have Information That Investors Do Not Have. Journal of Financial Economics, 13(2), 
187-221.  
Opler, T. C., and Titman, S. (1994). Financial Distress and Corporate Performance. The Journal 
of Finance, 49(3), 1015-1040.  
Rajan, R. G., and Zingales, L. (1995). What Do We Know about Capital Structure? Some 
Evidence from International Data. The Journal of Finance, 50(5), 1421-1460.  
Shyam-Sunder, L., and Myers, S.C. (1999). Testing Static Tradeoff against Pecking Order 
Models of Capital Structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 51(2), 219-244.  
Stiglitz, J. E., and Weiss, A. (1981). Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information. 
The American Economic Review, 71(3), 393-410. 
Taggart, R. A. (1977). A Model of Corporate Financing Decisions. The Journal of Finance, 
32(5), 1467-1484. 
Titman, S., and Wessels, R. (1988). The Determinants of Capital Structure Choice. The Journal 
of Finance, 43(1), 1-19.  
Titman, S. (2002). The Modigliani and Miller Theorem and the Integration of Financial 
Markets. Financial Management, 31(1), 101-115.  
 
Websites consulted  





9. Appendices  
Appendix 1: Variables used to assess the impact of access to external finance on SMEs' capital structure 
Appendix 1 reports the variables defined for the present dissertation, based on the database used (SAFE questionnaire). The survey conducts an array of 
questions, which approach both the supply and demand factors affecting the SMEs’ access to external finance. Having it in consideration, several questions were 
selected and adapted into either binary or categorical variables, depending on the answers given by the SMEs surveyed. Besides the dependent variables 
representing changes in leverage (DebtoAssets and BankLoan), both the demand side (GenEconOutlook, AccessPubFin, OwnCapital and CreditHist) and the 
supply side (IntRate, FeesandComiss, LoanSize, LoanMat, Collat and OtherCond) variables were defined. Control variables are included, i.e. Country, Firm 
Industry, Ownership, Maturity, Size, UnconsDebt, AccesstoFin, CrisisCountries, NoLarge and a set of variables considered influential on capital structure of 
firms by literature (Profit, FixedInvest, IWC). 
Variable Question Code 
Panel A: Dependent variables    
DebtoAssets Q2j: Have debt compared to assets decreased, remained unchanged or increased over the past 6 months? 
Dichotomous variable 
1 = Increased 
0 = Decreased, remained unchanged or not 
applicable because the firm has not debt 
BankLoan Q4d: Have you taken out a new loan or renewed such loan in the past 6 months? 
Dichotomous variable 
1 = Used in the past 6 months 
0 = Did not use in the past 6 months or it 
is not relevant for the enterprise 
Panel B: Explanatory variables     
Demand side   
GenEconOutlook 
Q11a: For general economic outlook, insofar as it affects the 
availability of external financing, would you say that they have 
improved, remained unchanged or deteriorated over the past 6 
months? 
Dichotomous variable 
1 = Improved 
0 = Deteriorated, remained unchanged or 
do not know  
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AccessPubFin 
Q11b: For access to public financial support, would you say that 
they have improved, remained unchanged or deteriorated over the 
past 6 months? 
Dichotomous variable 
1 = Improved 
0 = Deteriorated, remained unchanged or 
do not know 
OwnCapital 
Q11d: For your enterprise’s own capital, would you say that they 
have improved, remained unchanged or deteriorated over the past 6 
months? 
Dichotomous variable 
1 = Improved 
0 = Deteriorated, remained unchanged or 
do not know 
CreditHist 
Q11e: For your enterprise’s credit history, would you say that they 
have improved, remained unchanged or deteriorated over the past 6 
months? 
Dichotomous variable 
1 = Improved 
0 = Deteriorated, remained unchanged or 
do not know 
Supply Side   
IntRate Q10a: Please indicate whether level of interest rates increased, remained unchanged or decreased over the past 6 months? 
Dichotomous variable 
1 = Increased 
0 = Decreased or remained unchanged  
FeesandComiss 
Q10b: Please indicate whether level of the cost of financing other 
than interest rates, such as charges, fees, commissions, increased, 
remained unchanged or decreased over the past 6 months? 
Dichotomous variable 
1 = Increased 
0 = Decreased or remained unchanged 
LoanSize 
Q10c: Please indicate whether available size of loan or credit line 
increased, remained unchanged or decreased over the past 6 
months? 
Dichotomous variable 
1 = Increased 
0 = Decreased or remained unchanged 
LoanMat 
Q10d: Please indicate whether available maturity of loan 
increased, remained unchanged or decreased over the past 6 
months? 
Dichotomous variable 
1 = Increased 
0 = Decreased or remained unchanged 
Collat Q10e: Please indicate whether collateral requirements increased, remained unchanged or decreased over the past 6 months? 
Dichotomous variable 
1 = Increased 
0 = Decreased or remained unchanged 
OtherCond 
Q10f: Please indicate whether required guarantees, information 
requirements, procedures, time required for loan approval or loan 
covenants increased, remained unchanged or decreased over the 
past 6 months? 
Dichotomous variable 
1 = Increased 
0 = Decreased or remained unchanged 
Panel C: Control variables   




2 = Germany 
3 = Italy 
4 = Portugal 
5 = United Kingdom 
6 = Remaining countries from Eu28 
 
Industry D3: What is the main activity of your enterprise? 
Nominal variable 
1 = Industry (Mining, Manufacturing) 
2 = Construction 
3 = Trade (Wholesale, Retail Trade) 
4 = Services (Transport, Real State, Other 
services) 
5 = Other Activities 
Ownership D6: Who owns the larger stake in your enterprise? 
Nominal variable 
1 = Public Shareholders 
2 = Family or entrepreneurs (more than 
one owner) 
3 = Other enterprises or business 
associates 
4 = Venture Capital enterprises or 
business angels  
5 = One owner only  
6 = Other owner types 
Maturity D5: In which year was your enterprise first registered? 
Nominal variable 
1 = Old 
2 = Middle 
3 = Young 
4 = Startup 
6 = Other age  
Size D1: How many people does your enterprise currently employ either full or part time in at all its locations? 
Nominal variable 
1 = Micro (1-9 employees) 
2 = Small (10-49 employees) 
3 = Medio (50-249 employees) 
4 = Large (250+ employees) 
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Profit Q2e: Have profit (net income after taxes) decreased, remained unchanged or increased over the past 6 months? 
Dichotomous variable 
1 = Increased 
0 = Decreased or remained unchanged 
FixedInvest 
Q2g: Have fixed investment (investment in property, plant, 
machinery or equipment) decreased, remained unchanged or 
increased over the past 6 months? 
Dichotomous variable 
1 = Increased 
0 = Decreased or remained unchanged 
IWC Q2h: Have inventories and working capital decreased, remained unchanged or increased over the past 6 months? 
Dichotomous variable 
1 = Increased 
0 = Decreased or remained unchanged 
UnconstDebt 
Q7b: If you applied and tried to negotiate for this type of 
financing, i.e. (i) bank loan, (ii) credit line, bank overdraft or 
credit line overdraft, (iii) trade credit or (iv) other external finance, 
over the past 6 months, what was the outcome? 
Dichotomous variable 
1 = Applied and received everything 
0 = Applied and received 75% and above, 
applied and received below 75%, applied 
but refused because cost too high applied 
but was rejected, or the application is still 
pending 
AccesstoFin 
Q0: How important have the following problems (Access to 
Finance) been for your enterprise in the past 6 months? Please 
answer on a scale of 1-10, where 1 means not it is not at all 
important and 10 means it is extremely important.   
Dichotomous variable 
1 = SMEs selected Access to Finance as 
their most pressing problem between 1 
and 5 
0 = SMEs selected Access to Finance as 
their most pressing problem between 6 and 
10 
CrisisCountries It does not have a question. The variable represents countries that were mostly affected by the crisis in Europe. 
Dichotomous variable 
1 = Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and 
Spain 
0 = Remaining European countries 
considered in the survey  
NoLarge 
It does not have any question. The variables, based on the 
categorical variable size, distinguish effectively Small and 
Medium Enterprises (SMEs) and the large firms considered in the 
survey.  
Dichotomous variable 
1 = Micro, Small or Medium 




Appendix 2: General Summary Statistics 
Appendix 2 reports the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the regression analysis, aggregated into panels. Panel A presents the changes of capital 
structure proxies for SMES in Europe. Panel B contains the variables that try to explain the impact of access to external finance on capital structure, both the 
supply and demand side. Panel C includes also the control variables that are not reported in Table I. The summary statistics are presented as follows: number of 
observations, mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values, kurtosis, skewness, and quartiles 25, 50, 75 and 90. 
Variables Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min Max Kurtosis Skewness p25 p50 p75 p90 
Panel A: Capital Structure Variables 
DebtoAssets 16 916 0,1452 0,3524 0 1 5,0547 2,0136 0 0 0 1 
BankLoan 8 176 0,4267 0,4946 0 1 1,0877 0,2963 0 0 1 1 
Panel B: Access to External Finance 
GenEconOutlook 16 916 0,2231 0,4163 0 1 2,7694 1,3302 0 0 0 1 
AccessPubFin 16 916 0,0701 0,2552 0 1 12,3504 3,3690 0 0 0 0 
OwnCapital 16 916 0,3044 0,4602 0 1 1,7224 0,8499 0 0 1 1 
CreditHist 16 916 0,2521 0,4342 0 1 2,3034 1,1417 0 0 1 1 
IntRate 4 878 0,1501 0,3572 0 1 4,8405 1,9597 0 0 0 1 
FeesandComiss 4 878 0,2798 0,4490 0 1 1,9622 0,9809 0 0 1 1 
LoanSize 4 878 0,2386 0,4263 0 1 2,5041 1,2264 0 0 0 1 
LoanMat 4 878 0,1015 0,3020 0 1 7,9675 2,6396 0 0 0 1 
Collat 4 878 0,2015 0,4012 0 1 3,2147 1,4882 0 0 0 1 
OtherCond 4 878 0,2271 0,4190 0 1 2,6964 1,3025 0 0 0 1 
Panel C: Control Variables 
Germany 16 916 0,0857 0,2799 0 1 9,7679 2,9611 0 0 0 0 
France 16 916 0,0849 0,2788 0 1 9,8646 2,9773 0 0 0 0 
Italy 16 916 0,0848 0,2786 0 1 9,8808 2,9801 0 0 0 0 
Portugal 16 916 0,0258 0,1585 0 1 36,8246 5,9854 0 0 0 0 
UnitedKingdom 16 916 0,0777 0,2678 0 1 10,9482 3,1541 0 0 0 0 
Industry  16 916 0,2225 0,4160 0 1 2,7803 1,3343 0 0 0 1 
 53 
Construction 16 916 0,1061 0,3079 0 1 7,5478 2,5589 0 0 0 1 
Trade 16 916 0,2368 0,4251 0 1 2,5339 1,2385 0 0 0 1 
Services 16 916 0,3406 0,4739 0 1 1,4527 0,6729 0 0 1 1 
OtherActivities 16 916 0,0941 0,2920 0 1 8,7295 2,7806 0 0 0 0 
PubShareholdres 16 916 0,0355 0,1850 0 1 26,2301 5,0230 0 0 0 0 
Entrepreneurs 16 916 0,3788 0.4851 0 1 1,2496 0,4996 0 0 1 1 
OtherFirms  16 916 0,1473 0,3544 0 1 4,9635 1,9909 0 0 0 1 
VC 16 916 0,0064 0,0796 0 1 154,6361 12,3950 0 0 0 0 
OnlyOwner 16 916 0,3639 0,4811 0 1 1,3200 0,5657 0 0 1 1 
OtherOwnerTypes 16 916 0,0682 0,2520 0 1 12,7444 3,4270 0 0 0 0 
Old 16 916 0,7915 0,4062 0 1 3,0596 -1,4351 1 1 1 1 
Middle 16 916 0,1413 0,3483 0 1 5,2424 2,0597 0 0 0 1 
Young 16 916 0,0540 0,2260 0 1 16,5850 3,9478 0 0 0 0 
Startup 16 916 0,0120 0,1089 0 1 81,3422 8,9634 0 0 0 0 
OtherAge 16 916 0,0012 0,0352 0 1 803,5251 28,3289 0 0 0 0 
Micro 16 916 0,3584 0,4795 0 1 1,3490 0,5908 0 0 1 1 
Small 16 916 0,2802 0,4491 0 1 1,9581 0,9788 0 0 1 1 
Medio 16 916 0,2673 0,4426 0 1 2,1057 1,0515 0 0 1 1 
Large 16 916 0,0941 0,2920 0 1 8,7295 2,7802 0 0 0 0 
Profit 16 916 0,3441 0,4751 0 1 1,4310 0,6565 0 0 1 1 
FixedInvest 16 916 0,2871 0,4524 0 1 1,8862 0,9414 0 0 1 1 
IWC 16 916 0,2230 0,4163 0 1 2,7716 1,3310 0 0 0 1 
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Appendix 3: Summary statistics classified by Country 
Appendix 3 presents the number of observations and the mean values according to the SME’s country for the change in capital structure proxy (DebtoAssets 
and BankLoan) as well as for the access to external finance explanatory variables.  Here both variables that are a proxy for the demand side (GenEconOutlook, 
AccessPubFin, OwnCapital and CreditHist) and supply side (IntRate, FeesandComiss, LoanSize, LoanMat, Collat and OtherCond) are presented. The countries 




France  Germany  Italy  Portugal  Spain  United Kingdom 
Obs. Mean  Obs. Mean  Obs. Mean  Obs. Mean  Obs. Mean  Obs. Mean 
DebtoAssets 1 437 0,1642  1 449 0,1187  1 435 0,2063  436 0,1307  1238 0,1478  1 315 0,1437 
BankLoan 907 0,4322  719 0,4590  799 0,4894  249 0,3614  726 0,4518  496 0,3590 
GenEconOutlook 1 437 0,1169  1 449 0,1718  1 435 0,2509  436 0,3807  1238 0,4855  1 315 0,2738 
AccessPubFin 1 437 0,0452  1 449 0,0359  1 435 0,0725  436 0,1422  1238 0,1317  1 315 0,0692 
OwnCapital 1 437 0,2310  1 449 0,3823  1 435 0,1749  436 0,0803  1238 0,2480  1 315 0,3810 
CreditHist 1 437 0,2143  1 449 0,2905  1 435 0,2084  436 0,1812  1238 0,3005  1 315 0,3270 
IntRate 558 0,1416  345 0,0957  599 0,2154  159 0,1006  498 0,1406  239 0,0921 
FeesandComiss 558 0,3477  345 0,1536  599 0,4057  159 0,3333  498 0,2912  239 0,2427 
LoanSize 558 0,2007  345 0,2580  599 0,1853  159 0,1572  498 0,3233  239 0,2469 
LoanMat 558 0,0573  345 0,0696  599 0,0985  159 0,1258  498 0,1265  239 0,0962 
Collat 558 0,3208  345 0,1652  599 0,1786  159 0,1509  498 0,1586  239 0,1339 
OtherCond 558 0,2545  345 0,1768  599 0,1987  159 0,1572  498 0,2470  239 0,1883 
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Appendix 4: Summary statistics classified by Firm Industry 
Appendix 4 describes the number of observations and the mean values according to the firm’s industry for the changes in capital structure proxy (DebtoAssets 
and BankLoan) as well as for the access to external finance explanatory variables.  Here both variables that are a proxy for the demand side (GenEconOutlook, 




Industry  Construction  Trade  Services Other Activities 
Obs. Mean  Obs. Mean  Obs. Mean  Obs. Mean Obs. Mean 
DebtoAssets 3 764 0,1562  1 794 0,1583  4 005 0,1411  5 761 0,1314 1592 0,1652 
BankLoan 2046 0,4633  877 0,4230  1896 0,4119  2495 0,3671 862 0,5487 
GenEconOutlook 3 764 0,2322  1 794 0,1934  4 005 0,1960  5 761 0,2277 1592 0,2864 
AccessPubFin 3 764 0,0786  1 794 0,0736  4 005 0,0579  5 761 0,0706 1592 0,0741 
OwnCapital 3 764 0,3217  1 794 0,2882  4 005 0,2831  5 761 0,2956 1592 0,3675 
CreditHist 3 764 0,2744  1 794 0,2246  4 005 0,2424  5 761 0,2404 1592 0,2971 
IntRate 1 290 0,1473  531 0,1733  1 147 0,1595  1 335 0,1581 575 0,0974 
FeesandComiss 1 290 0,2496  531 0,3239  1 147 0,3235  1 335 0,3041 575 0,1635 
LoanSize 1 290 0,2411  531 0,2185  1 147 0,2276  1 335 0,2172 575 0,3235 
LoanMat 1 290 0,1000  531 0,0885  1 147 0,0924  1 335 0,0906 575 0,1600 
Collat 1 290 0,1822  531 0,2429  1 147 0,2153  1 335 0,2202 575 0,1357 
OtherCond 1 290 0,1822  531 0,2580  1 147 0,2520  1 335 0,2502 575 0,1965 
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Appendix 5: Summary statistics classified by Size 
Appendix 5 describes the number of observations and the mean values according to the size of the firm, for the changes in capital structure proxy (DebtoAssets 
and BankLoan) as well as for the access to external finance explanatory variables.  Here both variables that are a proxy for the demand side (GenEconOutlook, 
AccessPubFin, OwnCapital and CreditHist) and supply side (IntRate, FeesandComiss, LoanSize, LoanMat, Collat and OtherCond) are presented. 
Variables 
Micro  Small  Medium  Large 
Obs. Mean  Obs. Mean  Obs. Mean  Obs. Mean 
DebtoAssets 6 062 0,1354  4 740 0,1392  4 522 0,1577  1 592 0,1652 
BankLoan 2 572 0,3087  2 366 0,4214  2 376 0,5156  862 0,5487 
GenEconOutlook 6 062 0,1826  4 740 0,2213  4 522 0,2570  1 592 0,2864 
AccessPubFin 6 062 0,0592  4 740 0,0736  4 522 0,0794  1 592 0,0741 
OwnCapital 6 062 0,2397  4 740 0,3124  4 522 0,3607  1 592 0,3675 
CreditHist 6 062 0,1966  4 740 0,2662  4 522 0,2959  1 592 0,2971 
IntRate 1 301 0,2022  1 415 0,1675  1 587 0,1109  575 0,0974 
FeesandComiss 1 301 0,3805  1 415 0,3095  1 587 0,2130  575 0,1635 
LoanSize 1 301 0,1852  1 415 0,2332  1 587 0,2565  575 0,3235 
LoanMat 1 301 0,0799  1 415 0,0926  1 587 0,1059  575 0,1600 
Collat 1 301 0,2483  1 415 0,2283  1 587 0,1632  575 0,1357 
OtherCond 1 301 0,2683  1 415 0,2565  1 587 0,1783  575 0,1965 
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Appendix 6: Correlation matrix between Capital Structure and Access to External Finance 
variables 
Variables 
Capital Structure Variables 
DebtoAssets BankLoan 
DebtoAssets 1,0000 0,1527* 
BankLoan 0,1527* 1,0000 
GenEconOutlook (0,0001) 0,0691* 
AccessPubFin 0,0072 0,0244* 
OwnCapital (0,0430)* 0,0387* 
CreditHist 0,0021 0,0671* 
IntRate 0,0869* (0,0004) 
FeesandComiss 0,1335* (0,0496)* 
LoanSize 0,0740* 0,1039* 
LoanMat 0,0481* 0,0809* 
Collat 0,1237* (0,0350)* 
OtherCond 0,1149* (0,0432)* 
Germany (0,0231)* 0,0202 
France 0,0164* 0,0039 
Italy 0,0527* 0,0417* 
Portugal (0,0067) (0,0234)* 
UnitedKingdom (0,0013) (0,0245)* 
Industry 0,0167* 0,0428* 
Construction 0,0128 (0,0026) 
Trade (0,0066) (0,0165) 
Services (0,0282)* (0,0799)* 
OtherActivities 0,0183* 0,0847* 
PubShareholders 0,0062 0,0227* 
Entrepreneurs (0,0048) 0,0188 
OtherFirms 0,0062 0,0237* 
VC 0,0196* 0,0025 
OnlyOwner (0,0102) (0,0561)* 
Appendix 6 reports the correlation between the variables that represent the changes in capital structure of SMEs 
in Europe (DebtoAssets and BankLoan) and the ones that try to explain the impact of access to external finance 
on them. Hence both variables that are a proxy for the demand side (GenEconOutlook, AccessPubFin, 
OwnCapital and CreditHist) and supply side (IntRate, FeesandComiss, LoanSize, LoanMat, Collat and 
OtherCond) are presented. Control variables, which are not reported in Table III are also include. Namely, 
Country, Firm Industry, Ownership, Maturity, Size and a set of variables considered influential on capital 
structure of firms by literature (Profit, FixedInvest, IWC). The following sign applies for the statistical 
significance of coefficients: * p<0,05. 
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OtherOwnerTypes 0,0090 0,0223* 
Old (0,0242)* 0,0608* 
Middle 0,0197* (0,0410)* 
Young 0,0114 (0,0373)* 
Startup 0,0039 (0,0222)* 
OtherAge (0,0002) 0,0086 
Micro (0,0208)* (0,1617)* 
Small (0,0106) (0,0069) 
Medium 0,0213* 0,1150* 
Large 0,0183* 0,0847* 
Profit (0,0542)* 0,0364* 
FixedInvest 0,0774* 0,1296* 
IWC 0,0686* 0,0716* 
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Appendix 7: Regressions used to determine the access to external finance effect on SMEs capital structure: logit model and average marginal effects 
Appendix 7. 1: Direct effect of Access to External Finance variables on Capital Structure: logit and average marginal effects 
Appendix 7.1 reports the logit regressions (1) and (2) from regressing DebtoAssets and BankLoan on all the access to external finance variables. The logit 
regressions (3) and (4) are also reported from regressing DebtoAssets on variables that are a proxy for demand side (GenEconOutlook, AccessPubFin, 
OwnCapital and CreditHist) and from regressing BankLoan on variables that are a proxy for the supply side (IntRate, FeesandComiss, LoanSize, LoanMat, 
Collat and OtherCond), respectively. The correspondent average marginal effects are also presented in order to allow a correct interpretation of the variables’ 
coefficients. Control variables are not included since the present table aims to report only the direct effect of the variables of interest. The following sign applies 
for the statistical significance of coefficients: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Variables 
 Logit (1) and (2) Average Marginal Effects   Logit (3) and (4) Average Marginal Effects 
 DebtoAssets (1) BankLoan (2)  DebtoAssets BankLoan  DebtoAssets (3) BankLoan (4) DebtoAssets BankLoan 
GenEconOutlook  (0,0945) 0,1086 (0,0173) 0,0236  0,0277  0,0034  
AccessPubFin  0,0915 0,0274 0,0168 0,0059  0,1044  0,0129  
OwnCapital  (0,2614)*** 0,2552*** (0,0480)*** 0,0555***  (0,3384)***  (0,0419)***  
CreditHist  (0,1532)** 0,0445 (0,0281)** 0,0097  0,1323**  0,0164**  
IntRate  0,1494 0,1624 0,0274 0,0353   0,1411  0,0308 
FeesandComiss  0,4294*** (0,2008)** 0,0788*** (0,0436)**   (0,2144)***  (0,0468)*** 
LoanSize  0,4145*** 0,3961*** 0,0761*** 0,0861***   0,4490***  0,0980*** 
LoanMat  0,1661 0,3878*** 0,0305 0,0843***   0,4304***  0,0940*** 
Collat  0,3246*** (0,0511) 0,0596*** (0,0111)   (0,0723)  (0,0158) 
OtherCond  0,2131** (0,1532) 0,0391** (0,0333)   (0,1568)  (0,0342) 
Constant  (1,3293)*** 0,5201*** - -  (1,7235)*** 0,6396*** - - 
Observations  4 878 3 893    16916 3893 16916 3893 
Pseudo R2  0,0322 0,0178 - -  0,0029 0,0144 - - 
Wald chi2  177,59*** 79,87*** - -  40,65 66,36 - - 
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Appendix 8: Regressions used to determine the access to external finance effect on SMEs capital structure: probit model and average marginal 
effects 
Appendix 8. 1: Regressions results with control variables: probit and average marginal effects 
Appendix 8.1 presents the probit regressions (3) and (4) from regressing DebtoAssets on variables that are a proxy for demand side (GenEconOutlook, 
AccessPubFin, OwnCapital and CreditHist) and from regressing BankLoan on variables that are a proxy for the supply side (IntRate, FeesandComiss, LoanSize, 
LoanMat, Collat and OtherCond), respectively. The average marginal effects are also presented, allowing a correct interpretation of the variables’ coefficients. 
Control variables are included, i.e. Country, Firm Industry, Ownership, Maturity, Size and a set of variables considered influential on capital structure of firms 
by literature (Profit, FixedInvest, IWC). The following sign applies for the statistical significance of coefficients: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
Variables 
  Probit (3) and (4) Average Marginal Effects  
  DebtoAssets (3) BankLoan (4) DebtoAssets BankLoan 
GenEconOutlook    (0,0008)      (0,0002)     
AccessPubFin    0,0142       0,0032      
OwnCapital    (0,1852)***    (0,0411)***   
CreditHist    0,0615**    0,0136**   
IntRate     0,1295**    0,0453**  
FeesandComiss     (0,0881)*    (0,0308)*  
LoanSize     0,2164***    0,0756***  
LoanMat     0,2551***    0,0891***  
Collat     (0,0314)      (0,0110)    
OtherCond     (0,0867)      (0,0303)    
Germany    (0,0699)     0,1328      (0,0155)     0,0464     
France    0,0909**   0,0705      0,0202**   0,0246     
Italy    0,2834***   0,1077      0,0629***   0,0376     
Portugal    (0,0684)     (0,2333)**   (0,0152)     (0,0815)**  
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UnitedKingdom    0,0126      0,0226      0,0028      0,0079     
Industry    0,0338      (0,0112)     0,0075      (0,0039)    
Construction    0,1276***   0,0093      0,0283***   0,0032     
Trade    0,0246      0,0118      0,0055      0,0041     
OtherActivities    0,1594***   0,4149***   0,0354***   0,1449***  
PubShareholders    0,0633      0,0813      0,0140      0,0284     
OtherFirms    0,0163      (0,0682)     0,0036      (0,0238)    
VC    0,3647***   0,0446      0,0809***   0,0156     
OnlyOwner    0,0182      0,0120      0,0040      0,0042     
OtherOwnTypes    0,0252      (0,1099)     0,0056      (0,0384)    
Middle    0,1249***   (0,1032)     0,0277***   (0,0361)    
Young    0,1310***   (0,1214)     0,0291***   (0,0424)    
Startup    0,0685      (0,0197)     0,0152      (0,0069)    
OtherAge    0,1161      (0,7204)     0,0258      (0,2516)    
Small    0,0230      0,1299**   0,0051      0,0454**  
Medium    0,1025***   0,3310***   0,0227***   0,1156***  
Profit    (0,2526)***   (0,0001)     (0,0560)***   (0,0001)    
FixedInvest    0,2583***   0,2831***   0,0573***   0,0989***  
IWC    0,2748***   (0,0192)     0,0609***   (0,0067)    
Constant    (1,2366)***   0,1041      -   -  
Observations   16 916 3893 16 916 3893 
Pseudo R2   0,0282 0,0371 - - 




Appendix 8. 2: Regressions results based on success on external finance applications: average marginal effects 
Appendix 8.2 presents the probit regression average marginal effects resulting from a sample split based on UnconstDebt variable. If SMEs succeed in their 
application to external sources they are classified as unconstrained SMEs, whereas if the failed in their application they are considered constrained SMEs. Both 
regressions, DebtoAssets and BankLoan, on access to external finance variables are presented as well as their correspondent base line regressions, (3) and (4), 
respectively.  This table also reports the control variables that are not reported in Table VI. For the sake of simplicity, this table does not report the probit 
regression coefficients (that only indicate the direction of the average effect), the constant, the pseudo r-squared and the significance of the whole regression 
(Wald chi-squared). The following sign applies for the statistical significance of coefficients: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Variables 
 DebtoAssets  BankLoan 
 Unconstrained SMEs Constrained SMEs (3)  Unconstrained SMEs Constrained SMEs (4) 
GenEconOutlook  (0,0169) (0,0011) (0,0002)     
AccessPubFin  (0,0044) 0,0027 0,0032     
OwnCapital  (0,0580)*** (0,0286)*** (0,0411)***     
CreditHist  0,0045 0,0007 0,0136**     
IntRate      0,0577** 0,0373 0,0453** 
FeesandComiss      (0,0343)* 0,0258 (0,0308)* 
LoanSize      0,0400** 0,1164*** 0,0756*** 
LoanMat      0,0646** 0,1172** 0,0891*** 
Collat      (0,0203) 0,0802** (0,0110) 
OtherCond      (0,0030) (0,0013) (0,0303) 
Germany  (0,0502)** 0,0063 (0,0155)  0,0386 0,0781 0,0464 
France  (0,0029) 0,0204* 0,0202**  0,0317 (0,0974)* 0,0246 
Italy  0,0262 0,0681*** 0,0629***  0,0445 0,0434 0,0376 
Portugal  (0,0327) (0,0127) (0,0152)  (0,0764)* (0,0895) (0,0815)** 
UnitedKingdom  (0,0396)* 0,0210* 0,0028  (0,0336) 0,1301 0,0079 
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Industry  (0,0038) 0,0054 0,0075  (0,0123) 0,0331 (0,0039) 
Construction  0,0143 0,0283*** 0,0283***  0,0135 0,0094 0,0032 
Trade  (0,0116) 0,0038 0,0055  0,0113 (0,0169) 0,0041 
OtherActivities  0,0347 (0,0080) 0,0354***  0,1287*** 0,0907 0,1449*** 
PubShareholders  0,0652** 0,0058 0,0140  0,0584 (0,0645) 0,0284 
OtherFirms  0,0331** (0,0108) 0,0036  (0,0315) (0,0102) (0,0238) 
VC  0,1986*** (0,0021) 0,0809***  (0,0258) 0,1102 0,0156 
OnlyOwner  0,0207 0,0010 0,0040  (0,0021) 0,0393 0,0042 
OtherOwnTypes  0,0343 0,0039 0,0056  (0,0718)** 0,1034 (0,0384) 
Middle  0,0323* 0,0253*** 0,0277***  (0,0180) (0,0594) (0,0361) 
Young  0,0268 0,0325*** 0,0291***  0,0370 (0,1113) (0,0424) 
Startup  0,0340 0,0039 0,0152  0,0704 (0,0636) (0,0069) 
OtherAge  (0,0009) 0,0360 0,0258  (0,1930) - (0,2516) 
Small  (0,0017) (0,0037) 0,0051  0,0424* 0,0183 0,0454** 
Medium  0,0078 0,0077 0,0227***  0,0924*** 0,1210*** 0,1156*** 
Profit  (0,0686)*** (0,0470)*** (0,0560)***  0,0074 (0,0191) (0,0001) 
FixedInvest  0,0791*** 0,0342*** 0,0573***  0,1042*** 0,0508 0,0989*** 
IWC  0,0890*** 0,0365*** 0,0609***  (0,0191) 0,0161 (0,0067) 








Appendix 9: Regressions used to test the robustness of the results 
Appendix 9. 1: Regression results without largest firms: probit and average marginal effects 
Appendix 10.1 presents the probit regression results from a sample split based on NoLarge variable. If the categorical variable size assumes “Micro”, “Small” 
or “Medium”, NoLarge assumes value “1” SMEs, and SMEs are considered in the regression, whereas if size assumes “Large”, SMEs are disregarded from the 
regression. Both regressions, DebtoAssets and BankLoan, on access to external finance variables are presented as well as their correspondent base line 
regressions, (3) and (4), respectively.  The average marginal effects are also presented, allowing a correct interpretation of the variables’ coefficients. This table 
also reports the control variables that are not reported in Table VII. The following sign applies for the statistical significance of coefficients: *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Variables 
 Probit  Average Marginal Effects 
 DebtoAssets (3) BankLoan (4)  DebtoAssets (3) BankLoan (4) 
GenEconOutlook   (0,0241)     (0,0008)        (0,0053)     (0,0002)      
AccessPubFin   0,0090      0,0142         0,0020      0,0032       
OwnCapital   (0,1991)***   (0,1852)***      (0,0438)***   (0,0411)***    
CreditHist   0,0740**   0,0615**      0,0163**   0,0136**    
IntRate     0,1382**   0,1295**      0,0490**   0,0453**  
FeesandComiss     (0,0889)     (-0,0881)*      (0,0315)     (0,0308)*  
LoanSize     0,2201***   0,2164***      0,0780***   0,0756***  
LoanMat     0,2911***   0,2551***      0,1032***   0,0891***  
Collat     (0,0421)     (0,0314)        (0,0149)     (0,0110)    
OtherCond     (0,0946)     (0,0867)        (0,0335)     (0,0303)    
Germany   (0,0711)     (0,0699)     0,1424      0,1328       (0,0156)     (0,0155)     0,0505      0,0464     
France   0,0892**   0,0909**   0,0846      0,0705       0,0196**   0,0202**   0,0300      0,0246     
Italy   0,2761***   0,2834***   0,1003      0,1077       0,0607***   0,0629***   0,0356      0,0376     
Portugal   (0,0982)     (0,0684)     (0,2918)**   (0,2333)**    (0,0216)     (0,0152)     (0,1035)**   (0,0815)**  
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UnitedKingdom   0,0294      0,0126      0,0218      0,0226       0,0065      0,0028      0,0077      0,0079     
Industry   0,0375      0,0338      (0,0127)     (0,0112)      0,0082      0,0075      (0,0045)     (0,0039)    
Construction   0,1296***   0,1276***   0,0105      0,0093       0,0285***   0,0283***   0,0037      0,0032     
Trade   0,0274      0,0246      0,0081      0,0118       0,0060      0,0055      0,0029      0,0041     
OtherActivities   -        0,1594***   -        0,4149***    -        0,0354***   -        0,1449***  
PubShareholders   0,0668      0,0633      0,1277      0,0813       0,0147      0,0140      0,0453      0,0284     
OtherFirms   0,0300      0,0163      (0,0488)     (0,0682)      0,0066      0,0036      (0,0173)     (0,0238)    
VC   0,3698***   0,3647***   0,0468      0,0446       0,0813***   0,0809***   0,0166      0,0156     
OnlyOwner   0,0231      0,0182      0,0136      0,0120       0,0051      0,0040      0,0048      0,0042     
OtherOwnTypes   0,0731      0,0252      (0,1193)     (0,1099)      0,0161      0,0056      (0,0423)     (0,0384)    
Middle   0,1066***   0,1249***   (0,0786)     (0,1032)      0,0234***   0,0277***   (0,0279)     (0,0361)    
Young   0,1371***   0,1310***   (0,1425)     (0,1214)      0,0301***   0,0291***   (0,0505)     (0,0424)    
Startup   0,0888      0,0685      (0,0750)     (0,0197)      0,0195      0,0152      (0,0266)     (0,0069)    
OtherAge   0,1856      0,1161      (0,7231)     (0,7204)      0,0408      0,0258      (0,2563)     (0,2516)    
Small   0,0223      0,0230      0,1241**   0,1299**    0,0049      0,0051      0,0440**   0,0454**  
Medium   0,0999***   0,1025***   0,3203***   0,3310***    0,0219***   0,0227***   0,1135***   0,1156***  
Profit   (0,2554)***   (0,2526)***   0,0108      (0,0001)      (0,0561)***   (0,0560)***   0,0038      (0,0001)    
FixedInvest   0,2613***   0,2583***   0,2937***   0,2831***    0,0574***   0,0573***   0,1041***   0,0989***  
IWC   0,2580***   0,2748***   (0,0001)     (0,0192)      0,0567***   0,0609***   (0,0000)     (0,0067)    
Constant   (1,2308)***   (1,2366)***   0,0934      0,1041       -   -  -  -  
Observations   15 324     16 916  3 405     3 893   15 324     16 916  3 405     3893 
Pseudo R2   0,0277     0,0282  0,0368     0,0371   -  - - - 





Appendix 9. 2: Regression results based on access to finance as a pressing problem: average marginal effects 
Appendix 9.2 presents the probit regression average marginal effects resulting from a sample split based on AccesstoFin variable. If firms select “Access to 
Finance” as their most pressing problem between 1 and 5 they are classified as Non-Pressed SMEs, whereas if they selected between 6 and 10 they are considered 
Pressed SMEs. Both regressions, DebtoAssets and BankLoan, on access to external finance variables are presented as well as their correspondent base line 
regressions, (3) and (4), respectively.  This table also reports the control variables that are not reported in Table VIII. For the sake of simplicity, this table does 
not report the probit regression coefficients (that only indicate the direction of the average effect), the constant, the pseudo r-squared and the significance of the 
whole regression (Wald chi-squared). The following sign applies for the statistical significance of coefficients: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Variables 
 DebtoAssets  BankLoan 
 Non-pressed SMEs Pressed  SMEs (3)  Non-pressed SMEs Pressed  SMEs (4) 
GenEconOutlook   0,0082      (0,0179)     (0,0002)        
AccessPubFin   (0,0058)     0,0075      0,0032         
OwnCapital   (0,0251)***   (0,0377)***   (0,0411)***      
CreditHist   0,0216***   (0,0221)     0,0136**      
IntRate       0,0452      0,0454*   0,0453**  
FeesandComiss       (0,0365)     (0,0174)     (0,0308)*  
LoanSize       0,0369      0,1102***   0,0756***  
LoanMat       0,0573      0,1144***   0,0891***  
Collat       0,0097      (0,0162)     (0,0110)    
OtherCond       (0,0197)     (0,0294)     (0,0303)    
Germany   0,0026      (0,0386)*   (0,0155)      0,0541      0,0439      0,0464     
France   0,0240***   0,0214      0,0202**    0,0797***   (0,0319)     0,0246     
Italy   0,0503***   0,0591***   0,0629***    0,0610      0,0256      0,0376     
Portugal   (0,0035)     (0,0530)     (0,0152)      (0,0358)     (0,1131)**   (0,0815)**  
UnitedKingdom   0,0087      0,0146      0,0028       (0,0016)     0,0267      0,0079     
Industry   0,0005      0,0066      0,0075       (0,0009)     (0,0094)     (0,0039)    
Construction   0,0139      0,0354*   0,0283***    0,0273      (0,0186)     0,0032     
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Trade   0,0003      0,0069      0,0055       0,0269      (0,0084)     0,0041     
OtherActivities   0,0299***   0,0469*   0,0354***    0,1460***   0,1303***   0,1449***  
PubShareholders   0,0267**   0,0062      0,0140       0,0775      (0,0227)     0,0284     
OtherFirms   0,0022      0,0415**   0,0036       (0,0117)     (0,0295)     (0,0238)    
VC   0,0158      0,1514***   0,0809***    0,0752      (0,0095)     0,0156     
OnlyOwner   (0,0020)     0,0191      0,0040       0,0389      (0,0227)     0,0042     
OtherOwnTypes   0,0082      0,0214      0,0056       (0,0683)     (0,0009)     (0,0384)    
Middle   0,0215***   0,0232      0,0277***    (0,0665)**   (0,0167)     (0,0361)    
Young   0,0031      0,0505**   0,0291***    (0,0530)     (0,0260)     (0,0424)    
Startup   (0,0019)     0,0088      0,0152       (0,0702)     0,0508      (0,0069)    
OtherAge   -        0,1162      0,0258       (0,1824)     (0,2953)     (0,2516)    
Small   (0,0017)     0,0086      0,0051       0,0156      0,0609**   0,0454**  
Medium   0,0203***   0,0322**   0,0227***    0,0900***   0,1319***   0,1156***  
Profit   (0,0300)***   (0,0963)***   (0,0560)***    (0,0207)     0,0178      (0,0001)    
FixedInvest   0,0509***   0,0606***   0,0573***    0,1278***   0,0764***   0,0989***  
IWC   0,0456***   0,0833***   0,0609***    (0,0089)     (0,0046)     (0,0067)    
Observations  10 895 6 009  16 916       1 711      2 182      3 893     
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Appendix 9. 3: Regression results for European countries mostly affected by the crisis vs other European countries: average marginal effects 
Appendix 9.3 reports the probit regression average marginal effects resulting from a sample split based on CrisisCountries variable. If the categorical variable 
country assumes “Greece”, “Italy”, “Ireland”, “Portugal” or “Spain”, CrisisCountries assumes value “1” and SMEs are included in Crisis countries sub-sample. 
If country does not correspond to the specific countries, SMEs are included in Non-crisis countries sub-sample. Both regressions, DebtoAssets and BankLoan, 
on access to external finance variables are presented as well as their correspondent base line regressions, (3) and (4), respectively.  This table also reports the 
control variables that are not reported in Table IX. For the sake of simplicity, this table does not report the probit regression coefficients (that only indicate the 
direction of the average effect), the constant, the pseudo r-squared and the significance of the whole regression (Wald chi-squared). The following sign applies 
for the statistical significance of coefficients: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Variables 
 DebtoAssets  BankLoan 
 Crisis countries Non-crisis countries (3)  Crisis countries Non-crisis countries (4) 
GenEconOutlook   (0,0204)     0,0038      (0,0002)        
AccessPubFin   (0,0355)     0,0197      0,0032         
OwnCapital   (0,0417)**   (0,0404)***   (0,0411)***      
CreditHist   (0,0054)     0,0184***   0,0136**      
IntRate       (0,0279)     0,0810***   0,0453**  
FeesandComiss       (0,0121)     (0,0336)     (0,0308)*  
LoanSize       0,1056***   0,0614***   0,0756***  
LoanMat       0,0841*   0,0913***   0,0891***  
Collat       (0,0053)     (0,0140)     (0,0110)    
OtherCond       (0,0296)     (0,0271)     (0,0303)    
Germany   -        (0,0077)     (0,0155)      -        0,0499*   0,0464     
France   -        0,0290***   0,0202**    -        0,0180      0,0246     
Italy   0,0357***   -        0,0629***    0,0521*   -        0,0376     
Portugal   (0,0444)**   -        (0,0152)      (0,0661)     -        (0,0815)**  
UnitedKingdom   -        0,0080      0,0028       -        0,0047      0,0079     
Industry   (0,0027)     0,0099      0,0075       0,0345      (0,0178)     (0,0039)    
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Construction   0,0257      0,0288***   0,0283***    (0,0952)*   0,0336      0,0032     
Trade   0,0158      (0,0016)     0,0055       (0,0015)     0,0111      0,0041     
OtherActivities   0,0689**   0,0315***   0,0354***    0,1597***   0,1340***   0,1449***  
PubShareholders   0,0762*   0,0098      0,0140       0,0737      0,0202      0,0284     
OtherFirms   0,0059      0,0071      0,0036       (0,0312)     (0,0311)     (0,0238)    
VC   0,0188      0,0958***   0,0809***    0,1373      (0,0578)     0,0156     
OnlyOwner   0,0045      0,0092      0,0040       0,0562*   (0,0194)     0,0042     
OtherOwnTypes   0,0308      0,0051      0,0056       0,1113*   (0,0977)**   (0,0384)    
Middle   0,0165      0,0323***   0,0277***    (0,0585)     (0,0284)     (0,0361)    
Young   0,0341      0,0264**   0,0291***    (0,1556)**   (0,0137)     (0,0424)    
Startup   0,0547      0,0024      0,0152       0,0231      (0,0254)     (0,0069)    
OtherAge   -        0,0375      0,0258       -        (0,2600)     (0,2516)    
Small   0,0365***   (0,0007)     0,0051       0,0338      0,0365      0,0454**  
Medium   0,0395**   0,0232***   0,0227***    0,15067***   0,0932***   0,1156***  
Profit   (0,0967)***   (0,0445)***   (0,0560)***    0,0198      (0,0079)     (0,0001)    
FixedInvest   0,0478***   0,0599***   0,0573***    0,0574*   0,1123***   0,0989***  
IWC   0,0736***   0,0584***   0,0609***    0,0223      (0,0203)     (0,0067)    
Observations  4 011 12 903  16 916       1 203      2 690      3 893     
 
 
 
